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This thesis will examine the ways in which Palestinian women in Ramallah experience
and think about shame (eib). I will approach this topic with the intention of complicating the
traditional anthropological narrative regarding the honor/shame dichotomy. Within studies
focused on honor and shame in the Middle East, anthropologists have examined the ways that
honor and shame impact men and women (Abu-Lughod 1986; Baxter 2007; Glick et.al. 2016;
Harik & Marston 1996; Kanaaneh 2002; Rasmussen 2007; Zoepf 2016), yet rarely are the two
concepts, especially shame, examined independently. Overarchingly, I wish to understand what
Palestinian women in Ramallah think about shame, how shame manifests in their daily lives,
how it is enforced, and how and why shame ideologies have shifted across generations of
Palestinian women.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This thesis will examine the ways in which Palestinian women in Ramallah experience
and think about shame (eib)1. I will approach this topic with the intention of complicating the
traditional anthropological narrative regarding the honor/shame dichotomy. Within studies
focused on honor and shame in the Middle East, anthropologists have examined the ways that
honor and shame impact men and women (Abu-Lughod 1986; Baxter 2007; Glick et.al. 2016;
Harik & Marston 1996; Kanaaneh 2002; Rasmussen 2007; Zoepf 2016), yet rarely are the two
concepts, especially shame, examined independently. Overarchingly, I wish to understand what
Palestinian women in Ramallah think about shame, how shame manifests in their daily lives,
how it is enforced, and how and why shame ideologies have shifted across generations of
Palestinian women.
Women in the Middle East, and Arab women more specifically, have become a point of
anthropological inquiry within the last 40 years. In the 1980’s anthropologists began to shift their
focus away from theories revolving around segmentation, or tribalism, to other aspects of Middle
Eastern society (Abu-Lughod 1989). Within the segmentation narrative, “women either are not
considered at all or are viewed as that which men must protect or defend to maintain their own
honor” (Abu-Lughod 1989, 285). This emphasis on tribalism is not surprising, as early

1

I will use the Arabic word eib along with the English word shame interchangeably throughout this thesis. Eib is a
word that refers to shame in Arab societies. Although it is either spelled “eib” or “ayb”, for this thesis, I will use the
spelling “eib”

1

anthropological work focused on the Middle East prioritized topics that advanced colonial
agendas, which often translated to the association of men with politics in Western societies
(Abu-Lughod, 1989). Orientalist ideologies also contributed to the exotification of Arabs and the
Middle East, not only by social scientists but all dominating western powers (Said, 1978). Due to
orientalist ideals, women were studied through the lens of their male community members and
their lives were not examined in any nuanced manner.
Orientalist and colonial ideologies imparted on the Middle East left little room for
research that explored anything that did not directly contribute to their perpetuation. However,
this era of research began to subside within anthropology with the introduction of feminist
research in Middle Eastern focused studies. With its coming of age in the 1980’s, feminist
anthropology’s appearance in literature about the Middle East was mainly due to the growing
presence of women researchers in the field (Abu-Lughod 1989; Deeb & Winegar 2012). The
intervention of research on women in the Middle East exposed the biases that were present in
previous research. Feminist anthropology encouraged research that took the lives and activities
of women seriously, which has produced work that shows the “rich and varied character” of
women’s realities (Abu-Lughod 1989; Deeb & Winegar 2012).
However, within ethnographic writing, Arab women are still studied through the
dichotomous framework of the honor/shame complex. The “honor code” which has circulated in
academic discourse is a combination of both cognitive and pragmatic components (Abu-Lughod
1986; Baxter 2007). Referencing Paul Friedrich’s (1977) work, Abu-Lughod draws upon two
aspects of his configuration of honor: “In the first aspect it is ‘a system of symbols, values, and
definitions in terms of which phenomena are conceptualized and interpreted.’ In the second,
honor guides and motivates acts ‘organized in terms of categories, rules, and processes that are,
2

to a significant degree, specific to a given culture…’” (Abu-Lughod 1986, 86). Not abiding by
the honor code results in shame for both the individual and family (Abu-Lughod 1986; Baxter
2007). This research aims to veer away from this rhetoric because the manifestation of shame in
the daily lives of Palestinian women does not necessarily reference or present itself in a larger
symbolic framework. With this research, I aim to move beyond the “honor code” complex by
examining the specific ways that Palestinian women interact and negotiate shame in their daily
lives. This will allow for a more precise understanding of shame on a micro-level. With this
thesis, I will look at shame through the three angels of gender, space, and generational changes
in an attempt to understand how shame is experienced and thought about by Palestinian women.
Thesis Research Questions
This research aims to understand the complexities of shame ideologies in Palestine
through the perspectives of three generations of Palestinian women. Using data which was
collected through fieldwork conducted in the Summer of 2019 in Ramallah, I will explore how
Palestinian women in Ramallah think about shame, how shame manifests in their daily lives,
how it is enforced, and how and why shame ideologies have shifted across generations of
Palestinian women. This thesis will be split into three chapters: gender & eib, space & place, and
generational changes. Throughout these three parts, I will address my overarching research
questions:
(1) How and why have shame ideologies in Palestine shifted across time and how do these shifts
affect different generations of women in different ways?
(2) How do shame ideologies affect Palestinian women’s daily lives, including ways in which
they embody shame? By the ways which women embody shame in their daily lives, I mean the
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ways which shame ideologies manifest and present themselves to women outside of just
language and thought. Essentially, I want to understand when ideology affects daily action.
(3) How are shame ideologies enforced and contested?
The notions of shame that have been examined in previous anthropological research in
the broader Middle Eastern region have mainly focused on its interaction with honor (AbuLughod 1986, 1989; Baxter 2007; Deeb & Winegar 2012). Particularly, shame was examined
within the parameters of the “honor code,” which interprets honor as an “attribute or ideal
exclusively of men” (Abu-Lughod 1989, 285). With this research, I aim to divert from the
traditional narrative regarding shame and honor. I want to examine the way shame, as an
independent phenomenon, affects the lives of Palestinian women living in Ramallah. Rarely are
shame and honor studied outside of the dichotomy that anthropologists have situated them
within. With this research, I aim to critique the previously established theoretical foundations
that honor and shame have been built upon. The particular theoretical objective of this research is
to critique the structuralist theoretical framework that honor and shame have been situated since
the early 1980’s. Structuralism, which was coined by anthropologists Claude Levi-Strauss,
stresses importance of examining the relations between phenomena, rather than the specific
phenomenon itself (Strauss 2008). In this sense, this work calls upon some post-structuralist
ideas by analyzing shame as an individual phenomenon. However, I believe this research moves
past a post-structuralist analysis and looks at shame in a new lens.
As well, shame is rarely, if ever, examined outside of the context of Islam (Abu-Lughod
1986, 1989; Baxter 2007; Glick et.al. 2016; Harik & Marston 1996; Kanaaneh 2002; Rasmussen
2007; Zoepf 2016). Abu-Lughod (1989) succinctly describes why this practice is problematic by
stating “the anthropology of Islam cannot stand for the anthropology of the Arab world. Not just
4

because not all Arabs are Muslims, nor all Muslims Arabs, but because not all practices and
discourses in Arab societies refer or relate to an Islamic tradition” (Abu-Lughod 1989, 294).
With this research, I will examine shame outside of the context of religion and try to understand
what Arab Palestinian women, as multifaceted people, think about shame. As Ramallah is a
religiously diverse city, with both Muslims and Christians coexisting within its boundaries, I felt
it was inappropriate to exclude women based on their particular religious beliefs. With that being
said, one other objective of this research is to understand how shame ideologies manifest in the
lives of all Palestinian women, regardless of their religious beliefs. I did, however, listen to/
attend to the ways religion plays a role in women’s lives and have incorporated these religious
influences into my analysis.
History of Ramallah & Palestine
This thesis attempts to complicate the traditional shame/honor complex through the
ethnographic study of Palestinian women’s lives in Ramallah. I chose to focus this thesis in
Palestine, and specifically Ramallah, because my family has resided in Ramallah for the last 500
years and I have a deep-rooted connection with the area. Ramallah is a town that is not often
found within anthropological literature, but when it is, it is usually written about through the lens
of the Israeli occupation2. As well, within early anthropology, Palestine was notably absent from
research inquiries (Furani & Rabinowitz 2011). Traditionally, anthropologists only considered
Morocco, North Yemen, Egypt and sparsely located areas as “prestige zones” in the Middle East
(Deeb & Winegar 2012). However, Palestine may be a new prestige zone because of the
Throughout this thesis I will refer to the Israeli occupation in a few different ways. I use the terms “Israeli
occupation,” “occupation,” and “apartheid.” Although the term “apartheid” is usually only seen in connection with
South Africa, Israel has been defined as an apartheid state by sects of the United Nations. Specifically, the UN
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) stated that “Israel has established an apartheid
regime that dominates the Palestinian people as a whole” (Erakat 2019, 14).
2
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concentrated anthropological focus on the country (Deeb & Winegar 2012). When Palestine did
enter the academic periphery, it was “defined almost exclusively by the violence of Israeli
occupation” (Deeb & Winegar 2012, 539). This pivot towards Palestine was in part a result of
the tumultuous political reality that began in the 1990: the first intifada, the Oslo Accord, and the
second intifada.
Still, anthropological work focused on Palestine since the late 1980’s has
epistemologically adhered to the notion that nationhood, conflict, identity, and the state are the
main subjects that should be addressed in the Palestinian question (Deeb & Winegar 2012;
Furani & Rabinowitz 2011). Even when focusing on gender, researchers have addressed “gender
ideologies or gendered spatial practices in the context of conflict, nationalism, and violence”
(Deeb & Winegar 2012, 543). With this in mind, a larger aim of this research is to move away
from the traditional narrative that exists on Palestine within anthropological discourse. Although
the Israeli occupation is a hegemonic force within the lives of Palestinians in both the West Bank
and Gaza, it is not the only determining factor in individuals’ daily functioning.
It is important to first understand the historical context of the geographic location in
which this research was conducted. Ramallah, which is now regarded as a metropolitan hub in
the West Bank, is located 9 miles north of Jerusalem, 39 miles from the Mediterranean, and 32
miles from the Dead Sea (Hammoudeh 2014). Within early historical accounts, Ramallah was
established as a Crusader settlement that later became a Muslim village during the Mamluk
period (Hammoudeh 2014). However, during these periods, there is little evidence that the land
was fully occupied or used as more than farmland. During the Ottoman rule in the sixteenth
century, Ramallah transformed into a Christian village with the arrival of the Haddadin and
Naqash families. Traditional narratives and Ottoman census records support evidence that
6

Ramallah’s founding at this time was orchestrated by “the five sons (Haddad, Ibrahim, Jiryis,
Shuqayr, and Hassan) of Rashid al-Haddadin, a Christian from an area near Karak in
Transjordan” (Hammoudeh 2014, 38).
The name “Ramallah” derives from an Aramaic word consisting of two parts. The first is
the word “Ram,” which is “derived from the word Rama, which means height or elevation”
(Hammoudeh 2014, 38). The second part of the word, “Allah,” means God in both Aramaic and
Arabic. Therefore, Ramallah, based on Aramaic roots is translated to mean the “Mount of God”
(Hammoudeh 2014). This name is distinctly appropriate due to Ramallah’s elevation of 860
meters above sea level, making it situated 60 meters higher than Jerusalem. Ramallah is located
in the mountains surrounding Jerusalem, making it part of the mountain range of central
Palestine which extends from southern Galilee to Hebron (Hammoudeh 2014, 38). Ramallah is
located “west of the main commercial routes through Palestine’s central mountains, [which
links] Nablus and Hebron by way of Jerusalem” led to the city’s late development (Hammoudeh
2014, 38).
Although immigration into Ramallah did happen in the early 20th century, the number of
internally displaced people increased drastically due to the 1948 Nakba, the Arabic word for
“catastrophe” that Palestinians and others use to refer to the events of 1948. The Nakba resulted
in the displacement and deaths of over 750,000 Palestinians. After the war, many people from
the coastal region, specifically cities such as Jaffa and Haifa, migrated to areas in Gaza and the
West Bank. According to Jordan census, 13,500 inhabitants of Ramallah in 1953 were refugees
(Taraki 2008). The majority of refugees that came to Ramallah after the Nakba came from
villages that were near al-Lidd, Ramla, and Jaffa. These refugees predominantly settled in
refugee camps surrounding Ramallah. At the same time, the Nakba accelerated the emigration of
7

Ramallah natives, which was supported by the favorable change in American immigration policy
at the time.
Currently, Ramallah is the undisputed political and cultural center of the West Bank
(Taraki 2008). After the second intifada (2000 to 2005) Ramallah became an Arab city (although
smaller in scale) that is comparable to cities such as Amman, Cairo, and Beirut. With Ramallah’s
population only being around 60,000, within the last 15 years there has been an increase in
“social heterogeneity of the population; the growing social disparities and their normalization;
and the globalized, modernist urban ethos articulated by the new middle class” (Taraki 2008, 7).
With the increased violence from Israeli forces directed on Ramallah during the time of the
second intifada and after, the city gained a reputation of being a “five-star prison” on account of
the numerous arrests by Israeli forces that happened on a daily basis. However, in recent years
this has changed. Ramallah is now viewed as an “oasis of normalcy (and decadence) in a
desolate landscape of shattered urban spaces and violated rural expanses” (Taraki 2008, 7).
Although this thesis will not focus on the Israeli occupation, I believe it is important that
I highlight facets of larger Palestinian political history to better situate the realities in which my
interlocutors live. This inclusion is also added to help create a more concise understanding of
terminology which will be used throughout this thesis that directly pertain to Palestinian history.
Beginning in the late 19th century and early 20th century, Palestine was a territorial domain
within the Ottoman Empire, yet it was autonomously governed much like the rest of the Eastern
Arab provenances within the Ottoman State (Abu-Lughod 1988, 194-5). The geopolitical name
of Palestine was the product of British colonialism, particularly when the British Mandate was
established in 1922 (Abu-Lughod 1988, 195). Preceding the mandate, Britain and France created
the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916, which carved the Eastern Arab Provenance of the Ottoman
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Empire. France gained control of what is now Syria and Lebanon and Britain was allotted what
is now Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine (Abu-Lughod1988, 195). These agreements catered only to the
geopolitical determinates of France and Britain, leaving the region’s people out of their
decisions. The geopolitical instability that the agreement created caused the Britain to create a
precise definition of Palestine once they gained power of the region. This was necessary because
there were so many conflicting commitments associated with the region (Abu-Lughod 1988).
Along with the Sykes-Picot agreement, the British made a promise to the Sharif Husayn
of Mecca when he declared the Arab Revolt of 1915. This deal would have entailed the
establishment of an Independent Arab Peninsula, which included Palestine (Abu-Lughod 1988).
However, the British created the Balfour Declaration with the Zionists, essentially negating any
promise made to the Arabs. The Zionist Organization contested Britain’s exclusion of Jordan, or
Transjordan, within the definition of Palestine. By doing this, the Zionists created discourse that
argued that Israel would only be a small part of Palestine, which in reality was the entirety of
Palestine (Abu-Lughod 1988). Their argument was that a Jewish state would be established in
“Western Palestine” and the Arabs could have “East Palestine,” aka Jordan (Abu-Lughod 1988,
199). Zionists arguments stated that Palestine was a land without people, and the Jewish people
were people without land, so naturally the land known as Palestine should go to them. However,
when confronted with the reality that there were people who occupied this land, Zionists imputed
certain “qualities” to the population in order to justify either subordination or “transfer” (AbuLughod 1988, 201). The identity of the inhabitants of Palestine was used as a tactic to
delegitimize and undermine the people to project the Zionist movements agenda. The term Arab
was used to refer to Palestinian people, but it was shrouded with negative connotations. By
referring to them as Arabs, Zionist created a picture of uncivilized, underdeveloped, and nomadic
9

(Abu-Lughod 1988, 201). Another tactic that was used was to ignore the identity of the
inhabitants all together. The people were spoken about as if they did not have either a culture or
national identity. This delegitimized the people in question in order to strip them of their political
rights.
An important index of the success of this concerted effort to deny the
Palestinian/Arab identity of the affected population or to undervalue it is the
omission of any reference in the Belfour Declaration to either a national or cultural
designation of Palestine’s population whose civil and religious rights were to be
protected by its terms: on the other hand the Declaration was very specific about
the Jewish people. (Abu-Lughod 1988, 201).
Both the Zionist/Israel and British colonial forces determined that the Palestinian people’s
identity rested in the larger heritage of the Arab people and any self-expression on the
Palestinian front could be channeled through the larger Arab framework (Abu-Lughod 1988,
201). Although it is accurate to refer to Palestinians as Arabs, Zionist organizers would use their
Arab identity to paint them as anti-democratic, authoritarian, fanatical (religious or national), and
anti-Semitic. This contrasts with the research historians have conducted on the Palestinian
people. Middle Eastern historians have noted that “Palestine, regardless of its geographic
expanse is, and has been, part of the Arab region; its people have been largely Arab in terms of
cultural identity since the seventh century” (Abu-Lughod 1988, 202). They go on to state that
Palestinians, regardless of their religious background, are both Arabs and people of a specific
land.
The culmination of the geopolitical debates about Palestine that took place in the early
20th century was the 1948 war. In 1948, the Nakba was when thousands of Palestinians were
forced from their homes in order to create the state of Israel (Abu-Lughod and Sa’di 2007, 1).
Eighty percent of the Palestinians who lived in the areas that were overtaken by Israeli forces,
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which was about 77 percent of Palestine, became refugees (Abu-Lughod and Sa’di 2007, 3).
More than 700,000 Palestinians were displaced while many more were outright killed (AbuLughod 2007; Haddad, 2001). The Palestinians who did stay, around 60,000 to 156,000 people,
became nominal citizens who were “subject to a separate system of military administration by a
government that also confiscated the bulk of their land” (Abu-Lughod and Sa’di 2007, 3). The
Palestinians in the West Bank came under the uncaring rule of the Hashemites, the rulers of
Jordan, and the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip came under the equally repressive Egyptian
administration (Abu-Lughod and Sa’di 2007, 3). This continued until 1967 when Israel placed
both regions under military occupation (Abu-Lughod and Sa’di 2007, 3). The Nakba for the
Palestinian people represents dramatic and irreversible change that affected people on an
individual, community, and national level. However, globally, these events were celebrated as
the rebirth of the Jewish people following their persecution in Europe and subjection to the Nazi
genocide (Abu-Lughod and Sa’di 2007, 4). The narrative adapted by the international
community and Israel itself excludes the Palestinian people altogether and disregards the brutal
tactics used by Israeli forces to achieve their goal. Palestinian historian Elias Sanbar expertly
articulates the exclusion of power Palestinian people experience:
The contemporary history of the Palestinians turns on a key date: 1948. That year,
a country and its people disappeared from maps and dictionaries… ‘The Palestinian
people does not exist,’ said the new masters, and henceforth the Palestinians would
be referred to by general, conveniently vague terms, as either ‘refugees.’ Or in the
case of a small minority that had managed to escape the generalized expulsion,
‘Israeli Arabs.’ A long absence was beginning (Sanbar 2001, 87).
The Nakba is often viewed as the beginning of contemporary Palestinian history and the point of
reference for other events, both past and present (Abu-Lughod and Sa’di 2007, 5). It is the
marker for a history of “catastrophic changes, violent suppression, and refusal to disappear”
11

(Abu-Lughod & Sa’di 2007, 5). Landmark events in Palestinian history are measured from the
Nakba. For instance, the Belfour Declaration only gained significance after the Nakba. Events
such as “Black September (Jordan, 1970), the massacre at Sabra and Shatila (Lebanon, 1982),
Land Day (Israel, 1976), and the first and second intifadas (1987-1993; 2000-present) would not
have occurred if they had not been preceded by the Nakba” (Abu-Lughod and Sa’di 2007, 5).
The Anthropology of Palestine
According to Furani and Rabinowitz (2011), the ethnographic arrival of Palestine within
the discipline of anthropology occurred in four stages. The first was what they term “Biblical
Palestine,” which was the biblical rediscovery of the region that ultimately triggered more
European writing on Palestine within the nineteenth century (Doumani 1992; Furani and
Rabinowitz 2011). As they explain, “this conjuring of biblical time objectified contemporary
Palestinians as living fossils, [creating] a historiography that serves Europeans” (Furani and
Rabinowitz 2011, 478). The next stage of ethnographic writing on Palestine is the “Oriental
Palestine,” which contextualized Palestine as the cradle of Christianity and the contemporary
Orient (Furani and Rabinowitz 2011; Rabinowitz 2002; Said 1978, Said 1979). The third stage
was “Absent Palestine” where “western discourse on Palestine was ‘determined largely by
images, themes, and values that projected the Jewish Zionist version of history… [and] was
untouched and unaffected by the Palestinian Arab version of history’” (Furani and Rabinowitz
2011, 480). Finally, the last stage is the “Poststructural,” a term that describes a new wave of
anthropologists who question Israeli efforts to repress Palestinian nationalism (Furani and
Rabinowitz 2011, 481). It is important to understand the ways in which Palestine has been
analyzed in the past to understand how modern interpretations of Palestine are being used a
corrective to already established literature.
12

As stated previously, work on Palestine is almost exclusively examined through the lens
of the Israeli occupation (Deeb & Winegar 2012). Rarely have Palestinian people and culture
been examined outside of the parameters of the occupation, leading to a limited representation of
Palestinians (Abu-Lughod 2007; Abufarha 2009; Georgis 2007; Jabareen 2013; Nofal et.al.
1998; Sa’di 2002; Khalidi 2014). Ethnographic work in Palestine, focused on a variety of topics,
such as gender and politics (Abdo 1999; Baxter 2007; Rockwell 1985; Peteet 1986; Stein and
Swedenburg 2004), humanitarianism, development, and the refugee crisis (al-Husseini 2000;
Allen 2013; Challand 2006; Farsakh 2016; Feldman 2018; Gabiam 2012; Haddad 2001;
Quarmout & Beland 2012; Taghdisi-Rad 2015), and nationalism, space, and medicine
(Hammoudeh et.al. 2016; Jefferis 2012; Kanaaneh 2002; Rassin et.al. 2009; Shalhoub-Kevorkian
2012; Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015; Slyomovics 1998; Swedenberg 1995) has been firmly
anchored within the context of the Israeli occupation. In other words, Palestine has been studied
mainly as a product of colonial rule and imperialism. However, as with the rest of the Middle
East, Palestine has been subject to more a traditional anthropological lens. Abu-Lughod (1989)
states that the “foci of work in Middle East anthropology [is the] result of the interaction of the
particularities of the Middle East situation with the general romanticism of anthropology and is
uneasy sense that since most of its analytical tools were honed in simple societies they are
unwieldy if not useless in different sorts of contexts” (Abu-Lughod 1989, 279). The specific
aspect of the Middle East which she is addressing is the romanticized picture that was presented
by colonial powers who sought control of the region, which many refer to as Orientalism.
Edward Said coined the term “Orientalism” to describe this exotification of Arabs and the
Middle East. By placing a name to the phenomenon, Said shed light on the misconceptions and
misinformation social scientists take as fact within their research. Said’s objective is to correct
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the fallacies that encompass earlier academic literature pertaining to the Middle East. The
“Orient” has been assumed to be an inherent fact of nature, so embedded within western
ideology that the west has codified the “Orient’s” existence (Said 1978a, 4). “The Orient was
Orientalized not only because it was discovered to be ‘Oriental’ in all those ways considered
commonplace by an average nineteenth-century European, but also because it could be – that is,
submitted to being – made Oriental” (Said 1978a, 5-6). The lives of Middle Eastern people have
been molded and crafted by the western powers who dominated them, essentially making them
caricatures of people. Said states that Orientalism is essentially “a distribution of geopolitical
awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philosophical texts”
(Said 1978a, 12). Orientalism can be attributed to the romanticism placed on the Middle East
and its people by the West (Deeb & Winegar 2012, 538). Arabs were depicted as exotic savages
who create culture but do not know how to apply their creation to the world. This narrative was
embedded in anthropological research on the Middle East for a long time, and it is only in recent
years that anthropologists questioned its validity.
Orientalist notions are present when examining Palestine’s interactions with the West.
Said explains that “for the west, Palestine has been a place where a relatively advanced (because
European) population of Jews has performed miracles of construction and civilizing, fought
brilliantly successful technical wars against dumb, essentially repellent, uncivilized Arab
natives” (Said 1978b, 4). The history of anti-Arab rhetoric and prejudice that is prioritized by the
West has helped advance Orientalist beliefs. Orientalist beliefs have contributed to making a
simple perception of Arabs into a highly politicized matter, meaning Oriental ideologies in the
West have made the “Arab” a political entity (Said 1978a). Palestinians experience the
repercussions of Orientalist beliefs to an extreme degree. There exists “an almost unanimous
14

consensus that politically [the Palestinians do] not exist, and when allowed that [they do], it is
either as a nuisance or as an Oriental” (Said 1978a, 27).
Despite the growing efforts within the discipline, anthropologists are still attempting to
combat the exotification/ othering of Palestinians. This occurs through the continued work
focused on the conflict and political realities of the Palestinians and is especially true when
Palestinian women are the focus of these studies. The “web of racism, cultural stereotypes,
political imperialism, [and] dehumanization ideology” that hold the imagination of the west
regarding Palestinians is present too in academia (Said 1978a, 27). Focusing anthropological
inquiry primarily on the violence inflicted in Palestinians by the West, allows for a permanent
picture to be painted of a dichotomous violent and victimized Palestinian. This portrayal of
Palestinians, particularly Palestinian women, allows for an Orientalized otherness to cloud
academic writing. Although it attempts to counter traditional notions of Orientalist writing,
today’s writing on the conflict just perpetuates it in new ways. With this research, I combat this
framework by better understanding Palestinian women’s lives outside of the conflict. Although
orientalist ideologies are still present within western perception and policies regarding the
Middle East, anthropologists must take the next step to help eradicate their perpetuation.
Gender in the Middle East
According to Deeb & Winegar (2012), there are two key interventions that have informed
the vast majority of work on gender in the Middle East in recent years. The first “explores the
ways that women’s education, new family formation, and liberal feminism have not only shaped
the experience of modernity for women, but also highlighted women’s centrality to projects of
modernity” (Deeb & Wineger 2012, 542). The second intervention “focuses on the ways women
are often positioned as bearers of tradition or barometers of modernity” (Deeb & Wineger 2012,
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542). Modernity is a persistent theme within anthropology of the Middle East because of past
Orientalist tendencies within the discipline (Said 1978). For the past few decades, scholars
studying in the Middle East have used Said’s orientalist design to posit “women as cultural icons
or symbols of Middle Eastern society” (Hale 2009, 136). This was traditionally done to
demonstrate and support the already established ideology that demonstrates Middle Eastern
individuals’ backwardness and creates a dichotomous relationship between the East/West (Deeb
& Wineger 2012; Hale 2009; Inhorn 2014).
The rise of feminist anthropological critique in the 1970s/1980s shifted anthropological
knowledge of gender in the Middle East. Arab women went from being portrayed as submissive
members of their communities to active, autonomous contributors. A large part of this shifting
framework is attributed to anthropologists focusing on Arab women’s individual stories, as
opposed to consolidating women into one hegemonic category of the “Arab woman.” One of the
earliest feminist ethnographies that centered on the lives of women in the Middle East is Veiled
Sentiments by Lila Abu-Lughod (1986). In Veiled Sentiments, Abu-Lughod portrays the lives of
women in the Egyptian Bedouin tribal community, the Awlad ‘Ali, through the examination of
their use of poetry to express their personal feelings regarding gender relations and morality.
This ethnography was groundbreaking because Abu-Lughod was able to create such an intimate
look into Awlad ‘Ali women’s lives, showing their autonomy and humanity. Abu-Lughod’s
analysis of the particular stories told by the Awlad ‘Ali women helps to inform the larger
narrative of Arab women in the Middle East.
Subsequent ethnographic work regarding Arab women has directed its lens towards the
more nuanced and multifaceted realities that encompass women’s lives. Anthropological work
conducted on Arab women today is put forth with the “desire to counter stereotypes about Arab
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and Muslim women (which have been amplified by War on Terror rhetoric)” and with the
momentum of the “broader feminization of anthropology” (Deeb & Winegar 2012, 542). Work
on gender in the Middle East now attends to power in its multiple forms and scales (Baxter 2007;
Deeb & Winegar 2012; Fadlalla 2007; Yegenoglu 1998). For example, the political situation in
Palestine has pushed scholars to address gender ideologies or gendered spatial practices in the
context of conflict, nationalism, and violence (Abdo 1999; Baxter 2007; Deeb & Winegar 2012;
Rockwell 1985; Peteet 1986; Slyomovics 1998). Overarchingly, “feminist theory has both
inspired and benefited from Middle East anthropologists’ analyses of the effects of colonialism
and neocolonialism on women’s lives and crucial interventions into liberal feminist discussions
of key topics, including women’s agency and violence against women” (Deeb & Winegar 2012,
542). However, discussions involving a global feminism often have been spearheaded by
scholars who are either born, trained, or work in the West (Hale 2009).
Abu-Lughod (1989) points out a few theoretical developments regarding the
anthropology of Arab women. She states that as anthropologists have shifted to taking women
and their activities seriously, there has been a transformation in understanding women’s worlds.
This work includes a richer depiction of women’s relationships to one another, their children,
and the “men with whom they interact” (Abu-Lughod 1989, 290). Through this theoretical
development, anthropologists have realized that Arab women are actors in their social world, as
opposed to the passive characters they were traditionally portrayed as. Abu-Lughod discusses
how in early anthropological inquiry there was a focus on “harem theory,” which focused on
theory about women, gender, and sexuality. She uses “harem” provocatively in this case, “both
to denote the women’s world and women’s activities and to connote an older, orientalist,
imaginative world of Middle Eastern women, which shape[d] anthropological discourse by
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providing a negative foil” (Abu-Lughod 1989, 288). However, she explains that theoretical
developments in the area of Arab women has allowed for the deconstruction of the “harem.” This
deconstruction has allowed for the revelation that “analytical categories [focusing on the
anthropological insight of Arab women] often conceal[ed] Western cultural notions” (AbuLughod 1989, 291).
Palestinian women, in particular, have been subject to Orientalist objectification. The
portrayal of Palestinian women in media has framed women as the “womb of the nation” and
depicted them as either passive or subordinate participants in society (Jamal 2004; Kanaaneh
2002). Amal Jamal (2004) succinctly explains that Palestinian women are either seen as the
mother of the nation, mother of the martyrs, or as housewives (Jamal 2004; Jean-Klein 2000).
For Palestinians, land is personified to embody the Palestinian woman and women are meant to
be an extension of the national struggle (Slyomovics 1998). Although their voices are left out of
the dominant national narrative, ethnographic work on Palestinian women in the context of the
national struggle has shed light on their contributions apart from their roles as mother and
daughters (Peteet 1986; Peteet & Harlow 1991). However, the future of anthropological work on
Palestinian women must function both in and beyond the context of the occupation.
Eib (or Shame)
Within anthropology of the Middle East, most literature on the shame/honor complex has
focused on social structures and culture rather than psychodynamic processes (Joseph 1994;
Scheff 2000). The larger framework of honor and shame has traditionally been understood as a
cultural code, or a set of “normative representations aimed at the regulation of (inter)action”
(Latreille 2008, 599). Gilmore (1987), working on the gendered dynamics of small villages in the
Mediterranean, claims that the honor/shame “syndrome” regulates both inter- and intrasex
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relations. However, this classification of the honor/shame dichotomy has been problematized and
reanalyzed throughout the years (Abu-Lughod 2007; Baxter 2007; Latreille 2008; Pina-Cabral
1989; Stewart 2015). Generally, the traditionally rigid dichotomous relationship between honor
and shame has been conceptualized and expressed in writing through phrases such as “women’s
separate worlds’,” “gap between the sexes,” or “women’s subsociety” (Latreille 2008, 600).
When put in these terms, social scientists have determined that women do not fully participate in
what they deem as the larger hegemonic culture. This negates any impact and negotiation women
have on the functioning of their lives and cultures. However, to fully understand the honor/shame
dichotomy, it first must be pulled apart.
Often, honor and shame are framed within anthropological studies as an either-or
phenomenon. As in, either you have shame, or you have honor. However, in reality, I found that
it is not that simple: the superficial simplicity of these two phenomena comes from the fact that
they have been framed as a dichotomy. Though both honor and shame are important to the
understanding of Arab society, I suggest they should not be looked at in tandem all of the time.
For example, the absence of shame in women’s lives in Palestine does not necessarily equate
familial honor. In reality, the absence of shame just creates a neutrality that most people exist
within. Families can have “honorable” reputations, but that does not necessarily always go hand
and hand with shame. As I will show later, shame is responsible for the actions, thoughts, and
functioning of women in Palestinian society, whereas honor is not.
Methods
Participant Observation
Participant observation is an essential methodological step towards understanding ways
that shame manifests within Palestinian women’s daily lives because it allows for the researchers
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to become fully immersed in the day to day functioning the community which they are living. To
begin gaining perspective on the ways in which Palestinian women conduct their daily lives, I
conducted participant observation throughout the entirety of the project. I contained most of my
research to the city of Ramallah. However, I did interview one woman who lives in a close
village called Aboud. This woman works in Ramallah and switches between living in Ramallah
(where she and her husband have a small apartment) and living in their home in Aboud. I
interviewed her because she specifically asked me to come and see her at her home in Aboud.
My connection with Ramallah through lineage and my previous visits due to my
internship with the Institute for Palestine Studies the previous summer were essential for creating
initial contact with possible interlocuters. The time I spent in Ramallah in the summer of 2018
was instrumental in the formation of this study. It was through my interactions and discussions
with women that I solidified the idea to examine shame. As I am Palestinian-American and was
raised to very much adhere to Palestinian traditions, my inquiry into this topic also spurred from
my own life experiences. I began conducting participant observation by hanging out with family
and friends, going to cafes, and attending various events and celebrations around Ramallah such
as wedding functions and festivals. From the established connections I made, I ventured into
more places in Ramallah, such as the homes of women in town. Through participant observation,
I was able to observe how women act in public and pay particular attention to the ways shame
comes up in their daily lives. This helped to address my inquiry of how and why shame
ideologies have shifted, what are those shifts, and how does shame affect Palestinian women’s
daily lives.
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Interviews
My established connections in Ramallah aided in finding initial interlocutors for this
study. I then used snowball sampling to find additional interlocutors. I conducted interviews in
both structured and semi-structured formats. After establishing initial contact with potential
interlocutors, I set up formal and informal interviews with women from each generational
category (as explained below). I conducted interviews in places such as women’s homes and
cafes. Before beginning interviews, I obtained verbal consent from my interlocutors. I conducted
interviews in both English and Arabic. For the interviews conducted in Arabic, I had an
interpreter to help facilitate dialogue. I have included an interview sample questions on
Appendix A. The questions that I asked my interlocutors helped to address all three of my
overarching research questions. These questions were used as an initial guide when conducting
interviews with interlocutors. I recorded the interviews and took handwritten notes. As I
interviewed my interlocutors, I collected demographic data, such as age, household makeup,
religion, educational levels, etc., to better analyze the answers I received throughout the
interview process. All recorded and typed interviews and notes were stored in passwordprotected documents and folders on my personal laptop and backed up on a password-protected
external hard drive.
Intergenerational Approach
This research took an intergenerational approach. Through the examination of research
conducted by anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and numerous other social scientists, I
came to the conclusion that there was no set method for categorizing generations within studies.
(Connor 1977; Crumbley 2008; Leis & Hollas 1995; Nsamenang & Lamb 2014; Schwartz 1975;
Vasquez 2011; Ward 2008; Yan 2016; Yarris 2017). Each author I examined used
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categorizations that made sense to the particularities of their research site and people. Katherine
Newman (1996) states that generational identity can be seen as a “form of subculture, and
society itself becomes a patchwork quilt of groups defined by the formative events that shaped
their lives as young adults” (Newman 1996, 374). She goes on to define a generation as a group
of people who lived through a time period together and developed a “shared culture around its
iconic screen heroes, social movements, political figures, musical innovations, and cataclysmic
events” (Newman 1996, 374).
With this in mind, I decided to separate each generation into one of three groups. The
first is the youngest generation that encompasses Palestinian women who would consider
themselves daughters and do not have children of their own. These women fall between the ages
of 18 and 35. The second group is the middle generation that incorporates women who are
considered mothers, but do not have grandchildren. These women fall between the ages of 36
and 64. Finally, the last generation are Palestinian women who are considered grandmothers,
meaning that they have both daughters and granddaughters. However, I have included women
who are considered grandmothers but only have sons/grandsons. I make this choice with the
knowledge that Arab women play a significant role in the child rearing of their extended family
and community. These women are 65 years or older and have significant influence on their
female family members as they are seen as familial matriarchs.
I am using the generational markers I described loosely to categorize the women I talked
to but I paid slightly more attention to age than familial relations. This had to do with both the
limited timeframe I had to complete my fieldwork but also because some women did not live by
their families, who often still live in their home villages. As I utilized these markers to categorize
women, it was important to understand that many markers overlapped and that all categorizes are
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flexible. For each groups of women (daughters, mothers, and grandmothers), I incorporated other
social roles with which they identify, for example, their roles as aunts and cousins. This is to
account for the women who do not or cannot have children. I have used an arbitrary age
categorization system to flexibly identify the age groups I believe will correlate with each certain
life marker. I used the age system very loosely and used my interlocutors’ own opinions of their
social standing to categorize them. As stated above, many women might not identify with the
three titles (daughter, mother, and grandmother) I assigned them, but identify with other social
markers such as being aunts and cousins. Therefore, the age groupings allowed for more
flexibility and inclusion for classifying interlocutors. Within the parameters of my categorization
system, I acknowledge that all women I talked to identify as a daughter. I interviewed a total of
32 women; 16 women were in the youngest age group (18-34), 8 women were in the middle
group (35-64), and 7 women were in the oldest group (65+).
This approach allowed me to record a variety of life experiences and thus lends itself to a
more holistic depiction of shame ideologies in these women’s lives. As well, it allowed me to
compare the responses between women of the same generations while cross-examining their
responses with the responses of women in the other generational categories. Separating
interlocutors by generation helped to address my research questions regarding why and how
shame ideologies have shifted in Palestinian society. It was also essential in helping to bring to
light the reasoning behind ideological enforcement and particularly get at who enforces shame
ideology.
Through both professional and personal outlets, I was able to connect with individuals in
the youngest age group (daughters) while making initial contact. Making initial contact with
women from the youngest generational group was done for multiple reasons. The first has to do
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with my being a woman in her twenties and the likelihood of not obtaining automatic
accessibility and trust from women in the two higher age categories. Due to my age and lack of
status in the community, I assumed that women from the youngest age group would engage more
readily than their older counterparts. By connecting with interlocutors from the younger
generation, the research then used snowball sampling methodology to find participants within the
other two generational groups. Women in the younger generation were helpful in fostering
connections to women in the higher age categories, in some cases their own mothers and
grandmothers, allowing me to compare familial beliefs. Using the youngest generation to
connect with the two older generations facilitated a more trusting relationship between myself
and the two older generations.
This research took place within a 2-month period. There were many benefits and
drawbacks of conducting ethnographic research within this timeframe. A benefit was that I could
focus strictly on my research questions and streamline my time spent with interlocutors. A
drawback to conducting research in a short amount of time is that I was not be able to build a
deep rapport with all of my interlocutors. Additionally, as a Palestinian woman, conducting
research in Palestine is sometimes logistically difficult. Just as Palestinians living in the West
Bank, I am susceptible to Israeli interrogation and restrictions. Although I am an American
citizen, when I am in Palestine only my ethnicity matters. I know from both personal experience
and stories from members of my community that Israel puts harsher restrictions and obstacles for
Palestinians (both from the diaspora and those living in Palestine) traveling into the country than
other groups. I was fortunate that I did not experience any obstacles on my trip for this
fieldwork. I assume this is because of my previous visit to Ramallah and the fact that I have
family in the city who are able to help facilitate potential logistical barriers.
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Data Analysis
After transcribing the interviews, I began to analyze them by identifying and comparing
large themes that emerged. I then coded the interviews for subjects such as gender, marriage,
religion, and changes in eib. Specifically, I coded for three main themes that emerged during my
fieldwork. These themes were gender, space and body, and generational changes. I used these
three larger themes as my main points of inquiry and then further broke them down from there. I
then compiled excerpts of interviews I found to match the subjects I listed earlier and created
lists in a word document that grouped them together. As I wrote this thesis, I pulled excerpts
from the list to include to support my explanation. I did not use any specialized software during
my analysis process.
Ethnographies of the Particular
Palestinian women who reside in the West Bank, specifically those living within the
parameters of Ramallah, are not in any way a homogeneous population. Although they all
identify as Palestinian women, their lives and experiences are individualistic and varied. Often,
the portrayal of Arab women becomes a repetitive rhetoric that depicts women in the Middle
East as veiled, pious, and conservative. This representation has entered the public consciousness
through both western media and academic writing. Western media’s portrayal of Arab women
stems from the violence that is rampant in the region, whereas academic writing is typically a
response to the inaccurate depictions that are produced by western media. However, the
academy’s attempts to counter the negative stereotypes of western media still create a somewhat
monolithic image of the “Muslim Arab Woman” (Abu-Lughod 2002). Although this work
allowed for women to be portrayed in a more positive light, it was still a part of a larger
framework that negated any individuality the researcher was striving to achieve. I acknowledge
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that this demand to understand both the individual and the larger cultural context in which they
exist is a challenging task.
One way to combat this dilemma is through what Abu-Lughod (1991) calls
“ethnographies of the particular.” As Abu-Lughod explains the “ethnography of the particular” is
a tool for “unsettling the culture concept and subverting the process of ‘othering’” (Abu-Lughod
1991, 473). Generalization in anthropology can lead to the discourse of objectivity and the claim
of cultural expertise. This exposes the deeply flawed power differential that exists between the
anthropologist and their interlocutors. The generalization of individuals’ lives can very quickly
lead to the “othering” of certain groups of people. Abu-Lughod (1991) suggests that to avoid the
pitfalls of generalization is to show the “actual circumstances and detailed histories of
individuals and their relationships,” which in turn “would suggest that such particulars…are
always crucial in constructing experiences” (Abu-Lughod 1991, 476). Just as we as individuals
experience life in different ways than the people around us, so do the people whom we consider
interlocutors. Her third, and final, point is that by reconstructing individuals’ own personal
experiences and by examining their justifications and interpretations of what they and the people
around them are doing, anthropologists can get a clearer picture of how social life proceeds.
Going into my research I determined I would try to implement as much of this ethos as I
possibly could from the start. As I stated above, Palestinian women are not homogeneous. The
women I talked to during my fieldwork were no exception to this reality. One way in which I
attempted to combat the pitfalls of generalization was by asking all the women whom I talked to
which town or village they and their families were from. Although this may seem like an unusual
question to ask, in Palestine, the town or village which one’s ancestors have resided is a vital part
of one’s identity. Each town or village in Palestine has its own unique history and customs.
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Although Palestine was occupied by both the British and Ottoman empires before the current
settler colonial occupation that began in 1948 and continues to this day, Palestinian politics have
always taken place on a micro level. I also attempted to avoid generalizations by asking women
about their occupations, their families, the number of siblings they have, and some more
specifics about their lives. However, I must admit that due to the limitations and guidelines of
this thesis’s requirements, I do make broader claims about women’s beliefs and participation in
eib ideology on a societal level. As I stated earlier, I acknowledge that this demand to understand
both the individual and the larger cultural context in which they exist is a challenging task.
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CHAPTER II
GENDER AND EIB
Shame in Palestinian society is a deeply gendered phenomenon, with women as the most
affected gender. Reema, a 38-year-old Muslim woman from Khalil (Hebron) told me that “eib is
for a woman, related to women only.” In Palestine, women are the only members of society
whose lives are dictated by shame ideologies. This seemed to be a fact that was common
knowledge amongst both men and women. Although I did not officially interview men, I was
able to deduce through conversations with men in Ramallah that they too believed that eib only
affects women. These sentiments were usually vocalized through men beginning to list all of the
activities which women participate in that are considered eib (shameful). While discussing my
thesis topic, one man proceeded to list off what was considered eib in the style that I stated
above. He went on for about a minute and a half saying, “if she does this, its eib; if she does this,
its eib.” As he took a breath to continue his laundry list, one of the women I was with cut him off
and said, “why is it only ‘she’, what about ‘he’?” He turned to her and laughed and said “oh, no,
it’s never ‘he’.” All of the woman, regardless of their age, who shared their insight with me held
that same viewpoint. I argue that not only does shame reinforce gender ideologies in Palestinian
society, it is responsible for creating the very ideologies which it then maintains.
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Two cousins, Samira (25-year-old, Khalil) and Muntaha (25-year-old, Khalil)3, whom I
bring up again later in this chapter, perfectly encapsulate what eib is to women in Palestinian
society compared to men.
Samira: I think effects side of eib, it’s about being human. I think we have it [eib] more
than the males, the females. But the things are more harder for the girls, how you act,
what you wear. You can’t be normal because you want to be accepted [by] the society.
To be a good wife, to have a husband. So it’s harder for us. But for him [men], its easy.
He have the power to choose the girl he want, he has the power. It’s easier for him
because he can choose whatever girl he wants but for us, it’s different4.
Muntaha: Sometimes the same stake [action], a girl does it and a boy does it and the
girl’s punishment will be bigger than the boy because he is a boy.
Samira: I think when a man, he does something wrong, eib, they just give him excuses,
like it’s just a fault [one-time occurrence or accident]. We can easily forget that fault
[occurrence/accident], it’s normal, humans doing something. But if a woman did that, no,
it’s not a fault [accident], it’s a disaster and no one will forget that because, you know,
it’s not fair. It’s like we are not human, that we can’t do anything wrong. Like you [must
be] perfect.
The sociologist Norbert Elias, in his article “Shame and Repugnance,” theorizes that
shame is a phenomenon that occurs because of the fear of peoples’ assertions of superiority
(Elias 1989, 414). In Elias’s opinion, shame is a “form of displeasure or fear which arises
characteristically on those occasions when a person who fears lapsing into inferiority can avert
this danger neither by direct physical means nor by any other form of attack” (Elias 1989, 414).
Shame is merged with a sense of anxiety that materializes from the fact that the person feels as
though they have done something or will do something that contradicts the norm of the people to
whom they are bound (Elias 1989, 414). “Shame is about appearance, about how the subject
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Every woman mentioned in this thesis was given a pseudonym to protect her identity. I did indicate their true age
and the actual village they are from because they are important indicators of their identity and help to fully
understand their perspective.
4
I chose to keep the excerpts from my interviews as close to the actual interview as possible. I clarified points that
were not clear through brackets. I chose to keep these excerpts as is because I did not want to lose the individuality
and voice of these women.
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appears before and to others” (Lampert 2008, 43), leading to the internalization of behaviors that
elevate consequences resulting in shameful acts. In other words, shame can be classified as the
failure to act according to social values and the inevitable consequence of being publicly
disgraced (Stewart 2015). Shame for Palestinian women, like Elias outlines, occurs not just for
things that have happened but for things that haven’t happened or will never happen at all. Eib
ideology is used as a tool to prevent shaming for potential actions.
Shame in Arab culture is often referred to by the Arabic word “eib/ayb,” which can also
be used to show respect, honorable modesty, subdued femininity, and “deference to one’s elders
and social superiors” (Ilahiane 2019, 57). However, the network of values that are traditionally
associated with honor are generally connected with masculinity (Abu-Lughod 1986; Dubisch
1993; Stewart 2015). Honor is also associated with autonomy, meaning that autonomy within
Arab culture is strictly masculine (Abu-Lughod 1986). Honor is a system that is based on
hierarchy where individuals who hold more power, or autonomy, reap the benefits of the system,
i.e. men (Abu-Lughod 1986; Baxter 2007; Stewart 2015).
As I began to meet with women during my fieldwork, I quickly noticed commonalities as
to how women both defined and thought about eib, regardless of their age and background. With
each interview I conducted, the first question I asked was how each woman would define and
describe eib. Eib, according to the women I spoke to, can be defined as anything that the society
(Palestinian society) deems as wrong or against societal norms. A woman named Muna, who is a
52-year-old Christian from Ramallah, stated that “Eib, anything that should be shameful, is
something that would not go within the norms, traditions, and customs of a society.” The idea
that shame is something that goes again social norms was a sentiment brought up by every
woman I spoke to.
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One woman, Hanan, who is in her late 40’s and is a Christian from Bethlehem, stated that
“Eib is the thing you don’t want to do in front of all the people. If it’s something you can do in
front of the people, then it’s not eib. If you can’t do it in front of all the people, then it’s eib.”
This theme of being able to “do something” in front of people came up a lot in conversation. In
particular, the notion of right or wrong was a theme that almost every woman brought up. Many
scholars have identified shame in the Middle East as an emotion that is related to one’s sense of
self (Glick et.al. 2016; Rasmussen 2007). Shame is represented through the collective social
order, as well as through individuals’ emotional sentiment (Rasmussen 2007, 235). Muna also
explained that if one does not abide by social norms and makes decisions that are considered
individualistic, or against the social order, then their actions are considered shameful and not
acceptable.
However, shame is also contingent upon members of the community becoming aware
that an act was committed that veered from the social norms. The presence of shame results in a
Foucauldian sense of self-monitoring, which places individuals under persistent vigilance
(Rashidian et.al 2013, 868). The high constraint that is put on members of a society forces
individuals to become their own self monitors and subscribe to the “submissive effects” of the
hegemonic culture (Rashidian et.al 2013, 868). This point was articulated by a woman named
Abeer, a 22-year-old whose grandparents come from variety of backgrounds but until 1948
resided in Ramla before coming as refugees to Ramallah. Abeer spoke about the ways which
people follow societal practices. As we sat in a sunny yellow café off of one of the main roads in
Ramallah, Abeer’s initial nerves of being interviewed subdued and she launched into insightful
perspectives regarding shame ideologies. We were discussing her personal views of shame/eib
and she mentioned that she thinks there are people who intentionally and unintentionally follow
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the social rule. I found that phrasing particularly interesting and pressed further to understand
what she meant. She said:
So, I think these people are not the same as people who intentionally do it. But I also think..
I don’t know if you heard of the metaphor before – oppression is like a conveyer belt or
like standing on the conveyer belt – so like passive or active, yeah and so you’re just
standing on the conveyer belt and letting it just take you, you are still a part of the system.
And then if you are walking with it, you’re furthering the system. So what you have to do
to go against the system is to walk against the conveyer belt. Like, if you don’t speak up
against injustice, you’re kind of being part of it.
She uses the example of the conveyer belt to demonstrate the conscious and unconscious ways in
which women participate in the perpetuation of shame ideologies. Even being passive and
unconsciously adhering to societal norms marks you as a participant. The participation that Abeer
describes also explains the Foucauldian modes of self-monitoring which shame creates. Although
it may not be a consistent conscious effort, women’s decisions are guided by shame ideologies that
have been conditioned into their psyche from the time they were born. To refer back to Abeer’s
analogy, although they may not be moving with the conveyer belt, they are still standing on it.
Women often frame their self-monitoring in terms of knowing and doing what they believe is
“right” or “wrong.” By framing it in these terms, women make their participation in this system
more palatable for both themselves and the women they have influence over.
Within her article “Seductions of the ‘Honor Crime’,” Abu-Lughod (2011) poses a
question that gets at the heart of what this research hopes to achieve. She asks, “Is there a way to
think about the restrictions on women’s behavior other than as constraints imposed by men on
their freedom?” (Abu-Lughod 2011, 21). Women’s participation in the moral systems of the
Middle East is almost always explained as a product of men’s coercion. However, as AbuLughod points out, and I fervently agree, this argument is very problematic and heralds from
western feminist thought that portrays Arab women as individuals who do not have autonomy
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over their lives. This portrayal neglects to understand the social systems, such as gendered
structures, hierarchy, and communal relations, that affect people of color, especially Arabs.
With this in mind, I believe the short answer to Abu-Lughod’s question is yes. Patriarchy
is not the simplistic idea that men have total unwavering control over women. This definition
assumes a monolithic framework to a system of patriarchy and the category of “men” as a
gender. It also completely negates women of any agency, self-determination, or participation in
society. I like to use a metaphor of a clock to frame the way that patriarchy works in the case of
shame ideology. Imagine the face of a clock; it’s simple, shiny, and it tells you the time. Now
picture the inside of the clock: it’s full of cogs and complex parts that allow the clock to work.
It’s not as simple, or straightforward, but it is essential for the clock face to tell the time. In this
metaphor, imagine patriarchy as the shiny clock face. It is easy to point out that Palestinians live
in a patriarchal society and, although I am by no means arguing that Palestinian society isn’t
patriarchal, it must be acknowledged that claiming a society is patriarchal should not be the end
of one’s exploration to women’s place in that society. Patriarchy is not the only explanation for
shame ideologies and gendered norms. If one looks at the cogs in the metaphor, one realizes the
basic function of the clock is dependent entirely on the functioning of its inner parts. I argue the
women in society are equivalent to the cogs because without women’s cooperation and full
participation, patriarchy would not work. This can be thought of in terms of “patriarchal
bargaining,” which encompasses the powerful influences which shapes “women’s gendered
subjectivity” and determines “the nature of gender ideology in different contexts” (Kandiyoti
1988, 275). I found that women were full participants in the perpetuation of eib/ shame
ideologies not because they were being coerced by men to act a certain way, but because they on
their own volition perpetuate these ideologies. I found that the maintenance of shame ideologies
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was a direct result of women’s belief in the system and women’s influence over other women in
their lives.
Saba Mahmood, for example, explains that women’s lives should be explored outside of
the traditional western feminist notion that agency is the crossroads of the political and moral
autonomy of an individual in the face of power. She explains, “We must not think of agency as a
synonym for resistance to relations of domination, but as a capacity for action that specific
relations of subordination enable and create” (Mahmood 2001, 203). As Mahmood states, it is
important to not categorize women as being brainwashed by men into easy submission to
traditional patriarchal ideals. Women’s lives are not, and should not, be simply examined
through the binary of resistance or subordination. This does not give sufficient attention to
“motivations, desires, and goals that [are] not necessarily captured by these terms” (Mahmood
2001, 209).
One of the most important components of shame ideology that became immediately clear
as more women spoke to me is the fact that this is a system of beliefs that is directly
disseminated and reinforced by women to other women. The women I spoke with expressed that
it is their mothers who were responsible for their understanding of eib. However, as Palestinians
function in a communal society, other women such as aunts, grandmothers, and close female
family friends also play a large role in enforcing and teaching about eib. This does not
necessarily exclude the men present in a woman’s life from also helping to enforce eib
ideologies; however, I found that it was often women who took a more active role in ensuring its
maintenance. Zahwa, a 50-year-old Christian, explained this to me as we sat on her front terrace
at her home in a small village named Aboud, which is near Ramallah.
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As any person, there are different people or issues that affects the little ones. First of all,
like in Arab communities, it’s a long [large] family. So, everybody interferes in raising
the person…everybody tells you that it’s eib. When you go to school, the same thing.
You find some teachers, even your colleagues, they bring their own eib. Because
sometimes you will sit a certain way and they say ‘no, no, no my mother says don’t sit
like this’ because you’re a girl.
Another woman named Muntaha, who is a 25-year-old Muslim woman from Khalil (Hebron)
had sentiments that were very similar to Zahwa’s. I interviewed Muntaha in an apartment
belonging to my father’s cousin that could not have been more than 200 sq ft. and was filled with
about 10 women in total including myself. As one can imagine, in a space that small, voices can
carry but fortunately every time Muntaha spoke everyone quieted down. Along with Muntaha, I
was also interviewing her mother, aunt, and cousin. When I asked her, who taught her what eib
is, she responded by saying:
It starts with the family, maybe school because our teachers like the age of our moms. So,
we used to do anything in the school they know it’s eib. You are a girl, you can’t do that,
you can’t do this. Like the places we used to go, school, family. Family not just our
parents, my aunts, the whole family, your neighbors. Like if they have the chance to say
it, they say it…But when we were younger I think people think they have that effect on
us. So when they treat you from your age, like 5, 6, they start, like shaping you; this is
eib, this is not. So when we get older, I think they just give up. But some people still [tell
them eib], but not like when we were younger.
When I asked other woman that same question, many would answer with the simple answer of
“my mother.” As well, I asked women who could say eib to them and the answer varied
depending on the women’s age. For younger and middle-aged women, it was anyone who is
older than them, yet they tended to indicate that only people in their immediate family could say
it to them. On the other hand, it was indicated that no one could tell an older woman eib because
of her status in the family and community. I came to a realization when I was talking to Farha, a
74-year-old woman from Ramallah, about who is allowed to say eib to certain people. We were
sitting on her apartments balcony that overlooked a busy street. She sat directly next to me and I
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was turned so I could look at her while we spoke. Farha was about the twentieth woman I
interviewed during my fieldwork, so I had already heard the opinions from a variety of women.
As we were discussing who can say eib to her and in the past, who was allowed to tell her eib,
she indicated what every older woman had indicated already, that no one in the present can tell
her eib because of her age and status in the community. She went on to say that when she was
younger only people in her family could tell her eib. I looked up at her asked her who she could
say eib to. She said that she could only tell her family members (and very close family friends)
eib because it was inappropriate for her to tell people outside of the family eib. This is the point
where I took pause. Her statement about only being able to say eib to family members and not
neighbors was one that resonated throughout every interview I already conducted. I then said
“Wait… people can’t say eib to their neighbors or anyone outside of the family, but everyone
cares what everyone else thinks, even though, technically, no one can say anything to you?” She
turned to me with a half shocked, half amused face, laughed and said “Well, yes, I guess so…I
never realized that.” This statement indicates that although there is a precedent as to who is
allowed to tell a woman eib, women are in a constant fear of what people think about them and if
they consider their actions eib. This leads to women vigilantly self-monitoring their behaviors.
It is imperative to recognize that force is not necessarily the only means of selfmonitoring, especially in regard to Arab women’s realities, and that agency plays a role in this
paradigm. Mahmood (2001) examines the notion of agency through actions. She states that
“action does not issue forth from natural feelings but creates them” (Mahmood 2001, 214). In
other words, the practices and actions one engages in determine individual desires and emotions
(Mahmood 2001, 214). Many scholars within the Mediterranean and Middle East believe that
honor/shame is comprised of both an individual’s sense of self-worth and their reputation in the
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surrounding community (Stewart 2015). Bourdieu (1966) explains that the basis of the
honor/shame dynamic is an individual centering their moral code through other people’s
perceptions of them so that their image of themselves is “indistinguishable from that presented to
[them] by other people” (Bourdieu 1966, 211). I found that women felt that their perceptions of
themselves and the way their community perceived them had to align in order for them to not
feel shame. The common sentiment that I heard was that they themselves do not do anything that
is eib, so therefore they do not have to worry about it. However, I would argue that there is not a
conscious acknowledgement that they actively avoid certain behaviors to spare themselves from
communal judgement. In this sense, eib can be described as a form of habitus.
Originally theorized by Pierre Bourdieu (1977), habitus is the “durably installed
generative principle of regulated improvisations” (Bourdieu 1977, 78). To expand on this
definition, Bourdieu states:
The structures of a particular type of environment (e.g. the material conditions of existence
characteristic of a class condition) produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable
dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is,
a principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be
objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without in any way being the product of obedience to
rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing and conscious aiming at ends
or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and being all this
collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a
conductor. (Bourdieu 1977, 78).
Eib is a form of habitus in the lives of Palestinian women. Women follow eib ideology both
consciously and unconsciously. As well, eib is rarely every explicitly discussed among women in
society but all women know that it is a system which they are required to follow to ensure the
proper functioning of society.
Connecting Mahmood’s point of examining the notion of agency through action to the
concept of habitus can help produce a theory about the perpetuation and existence of shame
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ideologies in women’s lives. Within her writing, Mahmood states that, “habitus… refers to a
conscious effort of reorienting desires, brought about by the concordance of inward motives,
outward actions, inclinations, and emotional states through the repeated practice of virtuous
deeds” (Mahmood 2001, 215). To put it in simpler terms, one’s actions are dictated through the
culmination of societal and individual beliefs and practices to produce actions and thoughts.
With the theoretical framework of habitus in mind, Mahmood goes on to reevaluate Judith
Butler’s (1988) conceptualization of the model of performance. Butler explains that gender and
identity are instituted through the stylized repetition of acts (Butler 1988, 519). Through her
reexamination, Mahmood states that “the model of performance… emphasizes the sedimented
and cumulative character of reiterated performances, where each performance builds on prior
ones, and a carefully calibrated system exists by which differences between reiterations are
judged in terms of how successfully (or not) the performance has taken root in the body and
mind” (Mahmood 2001, 216). Shame, positioned within the framework of habitus, can be seen as
a component of one’s embodied performance. Shame is not an emotion or action that is coerced
or imposed by those in power; it is the individual holding themselves accountable for their
actions within their reality, making self-monitoring a more pervasive practice.
This means that the ideology surrounding shame does not flow through patriarchal
channels where it is then dispersed to women. On the contrary, it is through women’s actions and
direct interaction with other women that the ideologies surrounding shame are reinforced.
Women become their own self-monitors in a belief system that is rooted in the good standing of
men. When asked how shame impacts her life, Abeer gave me this anecdote: “I think the way it
would is whenever you’re doing stuff, you’re thinking whether it would be considered eib here
or how it would affect you and that whole thing of what you do doesn’t just affect you, it affects
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your family and everybody. And it’s not like you think about it all the time, but it’s like simple
stuff.” Essentially, the point Abeer is conveying is that eib is both an unconscious and conscious
phenomenon, making it a form of habitus.
Connecting back to my main thesis questions, eib is a phenomenon that centers around
the breaking of social functioning, traditions, norms. It is the foundation for gendered thinking in
Palestinian society, specifically it is the gendered indoctrination to womanhood for all
Palestinian women. It is a form of habitus in the lives of Palestinian women and is enforced and
passed on from older women (specifically a woman’s mother) to younger women. Eib ideology
is also maintained though diligent self-monitoring. However, eib is a phenomenon that occurs on
a conscious and unconscious level. In the section above I have showcased the ways which
women in Ramallah think about shame and how they would define it. I also explored how shame
manifests in the lives of Palestinian women and how it is enforced. Next, I will examine how
religion is affected by eib ideology.
Religion and Eib
I have approached my research outside of a religious framework for a variety of reasons.
First, Ramallah is a religiously diverse city that is the home to both Muslim and Christian
Palestinians. I felt that the exclusion of one religious group would be counterproductive to my
attempt to understand Palestinian women as a whole. My second reason for including both
religious groups has to do with the nature of eib. As explained in the first part of this chapter, eib
is a phenomenon that is linked directly to social functioning, beliefs, and traditions. Eib impacts
every aspect of Palestinian culture, and as religion is only a fraction of a society’s cultural
makeup, it would be irresponsible to concentrate my analysis solely on shame through the lens of
religion. Previous research that centers the honor/shame dichotomy or focuses on Palestinian
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women often does so within the lens of religion, particularly Islam. Previous research often
frames moral systems within Arab communities as a product of religious institutions. This is in
part because “this association of the subfield [Middle Eastern anthropology] with the
combination of Islam and Gender is undoubtedly related to greater public interest in the status of
women in the region and the use of women’s liberation as justification for U.S. military
misadventures in Muslim-majority societies” (Deeb and Winegar 2012, 544). It is within the
spirit to further deviate from this narrative that I structured my research.
During fieldwork, I made it a point to not ask specific questions about religion to my
interlocutors, but I did not steer them away from religion when they brought it up. When religion
was brought up regarding eib, the women I interviewed made it emphatically clear that eib has
nothing to do with religion. This statement usually came up while discussing what eib is and how
it affects their lives and the lives of the women around them. For instance, three interviewees, all
Muslim women, articulated their explanation of eib as separate from religion. The first woman
Samira, whom I mentioned in my first chapter, stated that “the religion [Islam] says it’s [going
against religious beliefs] haram (forbidden in Islam), it’s different from eib. Eib is only about the
people. It’s different because haram is from God but eib is from the people. It’s only traditions so
why do I have to commit to traditions from people [from the past] because the life is changing so
fast.” I found this to be an interesting point and asked her to elaborate some more. Her cousin
Muntaha, who was sitting with us at the time, added quickly that “people care more about what
other people think than what God thinks.” What she was implying with this statement is that
people who identify as Muslim are more motivated to follow eib than they are to follow Islamic
beliefs of haram. Along the same lines as Samira, a woman named Noura who is 21 years and
from Khalil (Hebron), stated that “in our society, people believe in shame more than haram”
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Although I am only showcasing these three examples, almost all of the women whom I talked to
made statements that reflected this line of thinking, regardless if they were Muslim or Christian.
All three women did say that older generations (i.e. their parents and grandparents) are
attempting to merge eib and haram together to persuade their children to be more pious. This was
viewed as a tactic used by older generations as an attempt to persuade younger women to veil.
Marriage and Sexuality
The one aspect of Palestinian women’s lives in which eib is affected by religious beliefs
is marriage. Marriage is not impacted by either religion’s specific doctrine, but more simply by
the religion that one follows. It is considered eib by both Muslim and Christian Palestinians to
participate in an inter-religious marriage. It is expected that one’s partner shares the same
religious beliefs that they and their family hold. This restriction was explained to be in place for
multiple reasons. The first is due to the intense prejudice that exists amongst Muslim and
Christian Palestinians for one another’s religion. It is not necessarily a prejudice that limits social
interaction or deep friendships, but one that stems from each party believing their individual
religious beliefs are “correct,” whereas the other party’s is not. The sentiments that were often
expressed to me regarding interreligious marriages was that either side would feel that their
loved one, if they converted, would be betraying the “true” religion and ultimately dooming their
afterlife. The second, and more logistical, reasoning behind the lack of interreligious marriages is
due to the court system. In Palestine, there is not a civil court for marriage. If one wants to get
married, they must get married either in the Christian court or the Islamic court. Therefore, if two
individuals from different religious backgrounds wanted to get married, one would have to
convert, otherwise their marriage can’t take place.
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It was unanimously expressed that marriage is something that all individuals wanted for
themselves and for their daughters. Marriage is an important life phase for young women in
Palestine because an unmarried woman is seen as a burden and shame to her family. Women are
expected to live with their families until they wed. I found that marriage was the barometer for
when a young woman could be considered an adult. Until the point of marriage, women are not
treated as equals to their peers who are already married. There was an unspoken belief that the
normative life stages of a woman could be identified as girlhood, marriage/raising children, and
old age.
Marriage is an important institution to examine when discussing shame for Arab women
because a woman’s “honor” is often measured from her lack pre-marital sexual encounters
(Adely 2012; Harik and Marston 1996). Abu-Lughod explains that “women are more closely
associated with sexuality through their reproductive capacities [therefore] they represent not the
embodiment of the social order, as do the mature men at the top of the hierarchy, but its
antithesis. And because ‘honor’ is attained through embodying the cultural ideals, in this sphere,
too, women are morally inferior” (Abu-Lughod 1986, 130). Shame is used as a tool to ensure
that young girls maintain the social order regarding marriage and sex. There was a consistent
consensus among my collaborators that that one of the most eib (or shameful) acts a woman
could participate in was that of pre-marital sex. It is widely considered that familial “honor” is
rooted in the virtue of women and it is the responsibility of the family, as well as the community,
to closely monitor any behavior that would go against those ideals (Harik and Marston 1996).
Traditional conservative families will attempt to marry their daughters off as quickly as possible
because they believe that if the woman is younger, than she will adapt to her husband’s family
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faster (Harik and Marston 1996, 70). As well, if a young girl is married as soon as possible, the
likelihood of her engaging in shameful acts, such as premarital relationships, decreases.
However, the idea that woman should be married early is being negotiated for a few
reasons. The fact that most young woman are expected to attend both primary school and some
form of university has made the expected age of marriage later. Compared to the two older
generations, women in my youngest generation group were not expected to marry until they
reached their twenties; however, the point in her twenties that was deemed acceptable for a
woman to marry is completely dependent on her family’s opinion. The age which women are
expected to marry varies across generations. As I stated, now women typically marry in their
twenties, however, in earlier generations, young girls would be married around the age of
fourteen. Some of the women I spoke to were married in this way and they fervently expressed
how they did not want that same fate for their daughters.
Yasmine (51-year-old, Bethlehem, Muslim), for example, told me a story of her
grandmother. She said that one day, when her grandmother was 14, she heard music outside of
her house. She was curious so she wandered outside to ask where the music was coming from.
She was quickly informed that the music was for her engagement. She had no idea that she was
engaged until that moment. Yasmine explained that for her grandmother’s generation, it was eib
to see your husband before the wedding happened, meaning that young girls had no idea what
the man they were to marry looked like. Juliette (50 year-old, Ramallah, Christian) explained
how marriage operated in previous generations and how it happens now.
In the old times, they make to marry the girls at a very young age, like 12. They marry
the girl and they don’t ask her. She didn’t see the guy till the wedding day. Maybe just at
the church. This happens in Ramallah in the old days. Once, the guy asks for the girl,
saying we want this one. She says no and runs away. She didn’t know the guy; she didn’t
want to marry him. But her family forced her to marry this guy. But now no, because all
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of the girls go to university, they go to work, they know each other, they have a special
relation between… not for sex, no sex before marry – that is very big eib!... and they
know him and they marry between each other, love, they live each other.
Education, which I will address in more depth in later chapters, has become an
expectation to secure a successful marriage. Adely (2012) states that, in Jordan, young women
become desirable and respectable marriage partners through their continued education. This
change in expectations before marriage has in turn pushed back the age which young women are
expected to marry. However, as Adely points out, there are different opportunities available to
young women depending on “socioeconomic status and their parents’ education and professional
status as with gendered expectations” (Adely 2012, 42). If a young woman has the
socioeconomic means and grades to go to university, then it is expected that she marries after she
graduates. However, sometimes women will marry while still in university and the decision for
them to continue their education falls on their husband. If a girl does not have the means to go to
university, then her family hopes she marries quickly, or she will most likely not marry. If she
can not secure a good marriage, then it is very unlikely she will secure skilled employment that
pays a decent wage.
Even after a woman is married, discussing sex or sexuality, or displaying affection
towards one’s partner in public is considered eib. These components of eib ideology have not
changed much across generations. Hanan (50-year-old, Bethlehem, Christian) explained that she
could not show affection to her husband in public. She said it was unacceptable for married
couples to kiss or hug in public. Even though they are married, public displays of affection are
considered shameful because sex, according to society, is only for reproductive purposes (AbuLughod 1986). Women are told that they should not be interested in sex outside of procreation.
Farah (74-year-old, Ramallah, Christian) told me a story from the early years of her marriage.
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She told me that in the 1970’s her husband went to the United States and left her alone with their
kids. After he left, she cried a lot and her mother-in-law told her it was eib to cry because people
will think that she’s crying because her husband left, and she needed sex. In reality, she was
crying because she was alone for an unforeseeable amount of time and had to raise her children
on her own while maintaining financial stability.
Conclusion
Shame in Palestinian society is a deeply gendered phenomenon, with women as the most
affected gender. Shame is often expressed through the Arabic word of Eib and indicates a form
of “respect, honorable modesty, subdued femininity, and “deference to one’s elders and social
superiors” (Ilahiane 2019, 57). This refers back to Muna’s point that “eib, anything that should
be shameful, is something that would not go within the norms, traditions, and customs of a
society.” In past research, shame was often framed through the lens of religion, particularly
Islam. However, as indicated above, eib is associated with larger societal practices and not solely
religion. Eib is taught to women starting from the time they are children and are often enforced
and reinforced by the women in their families, particularly their mothers. Eib ideology is a
system that women perpetuate to ensure that their daughters become respectable members of
their communities.
As women get older, they begin to self-monitor their own behaviors and thoughts to
embody eib ideology in their daily lives. Eib is a form of habitus in the lives of Palestinian women.
Women follow eib ideology both consciously and unconsciously. As well, eib is rarely ever
explicitly discussed among women in society (because it is eib to discuss eib), but all women know
that it is a system which they are required to follow to ensure the proper functioning of society.
Shame, positioned within the framework of habitus, can be seen as a component of one’s embodied
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performance. Shame is not an emotion or action that is coerced or imposed by those in power; it
is the individual holding themselves accountable for their actions within their reality, making selfmonitoring a more pervasive practice.
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CHAPTER III
SPACE, PLACE, AND BODY
One aspect of shame ideology in the Middle East that is not often discussed is the way
that shame dictates and affects spatial relations. This is particularly true when examining space
through the perspective of Palestinian women. Eib ideology does not only affect the mental and
emotional state of being for Palestinian women but impacts the ways they interact with the
physical world around them. With this chapter, I will take the opportunity to explore the
connection between space and eib. I will first explain how space is a product of social creation
and therefore can have meaning ascribed to it. I will then explore how the Israeli apartheid has
shifted and changed the ways in which Palestinian women interact with space. Next I will show
the ways which eib ideology is essential to the establishment of both the domestic and public
spheres. Finally, I will discuss how through eib ideology, women’s bodies can be viewed as
space to which meaning is ascribed. With this chapter, I will defer to my larger thesis questions
of how eib ideology manifests in Palestinian women’s lives and, to some extent, the ways in
which it is enforced.
Space and Place
Henri Lefebvre’s (1991) definition of space centers around the idea that space is a social
production. Specifically, he states that “social space is a social production… space thus produced
also serves as a tool of thought and of action…in addition to being a means of production it is
also a means of control, and hence of domination, of power” (Lefebvre 1991, 26). Essentially,
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Lefebvre advocates that space be thought of as a mode of production. However, as geographical
studies on space advanced, researchers such as Doreen Massey (2005) began to reimagine the
concept of space with a different approach. Massey encourages space to be thought of a
continuous entity, meaning that it is never stagnant. Massey pulls reasoning from Foucault who
says that in the past, space was treated as a fixed entity, something that does not move. However,
space should be thought about as a phenomenon that is constantly shifting and moving. Massey
and Duncan & Duncan (1988) argue that space is essentially a text which is experienced through
the active production of social relations. Space can be interpreted as a “product of social contexts
of historically and culturally specific discourses; [space is] constructed by interpreting
communities and they frequently, but not always, reflect hegemonic value systems” (Duncan &
Duncan 1988, 120). When looking at landscapes of space, it can be said that they hold an
important role in creating ideology, or supporting a set of ideas and values, within the social
process (Duncan & Duncan 1988). Furthermore, the interpretation of a particular landscape is a
political process that has material consequences.
Duncan & Duncan state that “if landscapes are texts which are read, interpreted according
to an ingrained cultural framework of interpretation, if they are often read ‘inattentively’ at a
particular or nondiscoursive level, then they may be inculcating their readers with a set of
notions about how the society is organized” (Duncan & Duncan 1988, 123). Thinking about the
production and interpretation of landscape and space as a political process in the framework of
the Israeli occupation raises questions of hegemonic values and whose text is worthy of being
read. Within the last ninety years of occupation within the Palestinian territories, space as a tool
to enforce political restrictions has become an obvious reality. Space is the central point of the
entire conflict; therefore, the regulation on space by Israeli forces has proven to be a way of
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restraining Palestinian people. Restrictions of space through the creation of checkpoints, walls,
and armed force have led to the governing of both Palestinian space and Palestinians’ navigation
within said space. Palestinian people are restricted in every aspect of their lives. They cannot
move within their designated space without being forced to check in with the hegemonic power
structure of the Israeli government and army. Space, in this sense, is a means of securing a
singular political ideology.
To bring together feminist geographers’ thought on the connection between space and the
women who reside in it, I will delve into McDowell’s (1999) analysis on the subject. McDowell
discusses the relation between gender and the nation-state and how feminist scholars have
unpacked the realities of those two entities. She states that “the relationship between ‘race’ or
ethnicity and gender become particularly significant… as nations are usually defined in terms of
the links between a particular space or territory and its peoples to the exclusion of ‘others’”
(McDowell 1999, 170). The state has power over the gendered relations of the individuals living
within its bounds. McDowell looks at different aspects of the gender / nation-state dichotomy to
help support her argument, particularly she examines past feminist literature on the subject. The
first aspect “revolves around the relationship between the state and civil society and the actions
of the state as a judge between citizens in its distributional and coercive policies” (McDowell
1999, 171). McDowell then explores the gender / nation/state dichotomy concerns women and
the “welfare state.” This pertains to health services women receive from the state and how the
state is a key player in commodifying and regulating women’s bodies: “Through these welfare
institutions and through the legal system, therefore, ‘private’ issues of sexuality, childbirth, and
the management of health are regulated and controlled” (McDowell 1999, 171). She then
analyzes the dichotomy of gender and the state through the approach of critical feminist cultural
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and literary studies, which looks at images, symbols, and representation of the nation in text,
pictures, and iconography within the built environment (McDowell 1999, 171).
With the understanding of the larger political context of spatial realities in the apartheid,
one can begin to unpack how both Arab cultural structures and Israeli military occupation merge
to create particular realities for Palestinian women. Women in the Middle East, as a whole, are
often portrayed as helpless individuals who only follow the orders of the men in their lives.
However, this very generalized portrayal of Arab women completely ignores the autonomy
women hold over their participation and negotiation of cultural norms. This negotiation takes
place on both a micro and macro level, where women within Palestinian society are susceptible
to ideologies that govern the space they are allowed to occupy. Palestinian women must navigate
within a patriarchal societal structure that dictates what space they can occupy, as well as
negotiate their position within the larger Israeli political hegemony.
We first must call upon work from feminist geographers to understand how patriarchal
structures affect spatial relations. Peake (1993) states that the patriarchal structure (patriarchy
built into the physical landscape) within urban, and I argue rural, spaces has been largely
unaccounted for within research. By looking at patriarchal structuring, Peake is able to unpack
how it affects gender, race, class, and sexuality. Her first argument encompasses a feminist
critique that states that the city, and in particular the physical city space, is shaped to confine
women to traditional roles. By traditional roles, she means that women are firmly planted within
the domestic sphere, which makes access to “the city” only possible through patriarchal social
relations such as marriage and the family. The second point is that that women’s responsibility
for domestic labor circumscribes their mobility within space (Peake 1993, 147). Women’s
mobility within the city is limited because the patriarchal structures that keep them in the
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domestic sphere also ensure that the domestic sphere is specifically located. By specifically
located, I mean that the domestic sphere exists only within the home and its existence in this
space cannot be negotiated or moved.
In Palestine, there is a distinct difference between the way that shame ideology is
enforced in cities as opposed to villages. Many of the women I talked to were originally from
smaller villages and there was a consensus that shame in villages is more stringent than shame in
Ramallah. In particular, women’s access to space in rural areas is more controlled than in cities.
Below is a vignette by a 38-year-old woman named Reema from Hebron: (Translated by
interpreter)
She’s from Hebron. For villagers and for Muslims, it’s not appropriate that a man enter
the house and sees the women inside. There should be a man there. So, she said that there
are people that came for the hot water to the parents, and her son didn’t let them in the
house because his sisters are there. His mom is not there, and his father is not there. So,
he’s young but he knows its eib to let anyone come inside the house. And she was telling
me about a story she heard today from her sister in Hebron. A boy used to bring his
friends home and they used to stay late. So, they saw his sister and they came once when
nobody was home in the evening and they took the girl. She’s disabled and they took her
and raped her. So she’s [Reema] afraid about her daughters and she wants to tell them the
story, to tell her husband, to tell everybody, so they take care of this thing. In
consideration to not let anyone into the house and she wants to separate her house so
anyone who enters into the salon or the living room, he doesn’t see her daughters.
Reema’s story from her sister is an example of how shame ideology, and stories of
consequences when shame ideologies are ignored, impact the spaces that women can occupy
even within the domestic realm. The threat of violence is a motivation to reinforce shame
ideologies and to renegotiate which spaces are deemed acceptable for women to occupy.
Although Khalil (Hebron) has a larger land mass than Ramallah, it still exists in the framework
that isolates women in the home. The women who moved to Ramallah from smaller villages
expressed their concerns with the “urban” ideology that exists in Ramallah. Ramallah is called an
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“open city” by people all over Palestine. I gathered that the label of an “open city” exists because
Ramallah is a town where many people resettled after their villages were destroyed or raided by
Israeli forces. People consider Ramallah a place where any Palestinian can go and feel welcome.
However, in terms of shame ideology’s relation to space, Ramallah poses new challenges to
already established boundaries. While talking to Zahwa, she elaborated on this point by also
explaining that certain regions of the country bring certain ideological beliefs on shame. She
stated that, although there has been a lot of change in Ramallah, both the northern and southern
parts of Palestine have not advanced as much. For instance, in the northern and southern villages,
girls are still forced to marry at 14 years old. She indicated that Palestinians in these regions do
not change their ideologies until they leave their home village. She indicates that the shift in
shame ideology is connected to social progress, which many villages have not experience in the
same ways that Ramallah has.
Due to the high volume of individuals, especially women, moving their families to
Ramallah, people have become more protective of their female relatives because of the
unfamiliarity of the surroundings and people. Space is used as a way to protect women and the
way society gets women to abide by spatial restrictions is through shame. Jamileh [30 years old
from Khalil (Hebron)] stated that when she was a child, her family used to live in a small village
in Jordan for a period, where they had their own house. The privacy of the house allowed for her
to play outside whenever she wanted, as it was deemed safe because they had no neighbors.
However, her family decided to move to Ramallah and that sense of security and movement
promptly ended. Ramallah is a larger city and the privacy that Jamileh’s family experienced in
their house in Jordan vanished. When they moved to Ramallah they moved into a condo in a
larger complex, so the shift from having no neighbors to neighbors was striking. As well, her
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family did not know any of their new neighbors in Ramallah, whereas they knew all of the
people in their small village in Jordan. Due to the perceived danger of living in a larger city
surrounded by neighbors whom they did not know, Jamileh’s mother determined that it would be
inappropriate for her daughter to go outside like she used to in Jordan. The fear of something
happening to her led her mother to impose the idea in her that going outside is eib. Jamileh’s
story shows that her family’s move from rural Jordan to the city of Ramallah affected the spaces
she was allowed to occupy within her house and neighborhood.
By making the movement through space restricted, society ensures that women are
restricted to domestic spheres. This framework of spatial relations regarding Palestinian women
and their negotiation of shame in their lives was immediately apparent when I began to talk to
women about their lives. Spatial restrictions varied among the various generations of women, yet
the core areas of “traditional women’s roles” remained the same. Women in all generations were
expected to be restricted to domestic spaces. For younger women, the negotiation of spatial
access is even greater than for women of previous generations. For example, younger women are
expected to receive a formal education, often extending to higher education due to the poor job
market and the economic instability that Palestine is experiencing. However, women in
Palestinian society are also expected to stay within the “traditional sphere” or “domestic sphere,”
which, as Peake (1993) indicates, is the way that women are kept spatially confined. Shame
ideologies in Palestine allow for this confinement to occur in a more systematic way. Shame
places the responsibility on women to maintain spatial divisions. Therefore, shame becomes a
vehicle for maintaining the social production of space.
Pierre Bourdieu (1990) analyzed how spaces are gendered in order to relate power
differentials between men and women. Through this Bourdieu suggests that the code of honor
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and shame is inscribed into the built environment (Bourdieu 1990, Ilahaine 2019). Most women
in the older generation of my collaborators brought up the idea of spatial limitations in regard to
shame ideologies. One older woman indicated that younger women are now beginning to push
the boundaries that have been previously cemented. She stated that younger women are entering
spaces that have formerly been banned to women in her generation, such as male-only coffee
shops. Within the context of Palestine, male-only cafés are a stark example of patriarchal spatial
separations. To briefly describe them, a male-only café is like any other coffee shop in Palestine.
They serve coffee, tea, some food and hookah for guests to order and have tables and chairs both
inside and outside the cafes. They look very similar to cafes that are frequented by both sexes.
There is no explicit rule or regulation that strictly prohibits women entering the premises of these
cafes; however, it is an unspoken social agreement that everyone in the society understands.
One evening when I was walking in the old city of Ramallah with one of my
collaborators, who was in her early 20’s, we passed one of the oldest male-only cafés in the city.
She turned to me and said, “Do you see that place? We aren’t allowed to go there. Do you know
that?” I looked over at the café that was filled with men of all ages drinking from cups, playing
cards, and smoking hookah and looked back over at her. I told her yes, I did know that we as
women weren’t allowed there, but asked why? She chuckled and said, “Isn’t it ridiculous, but
some women are starting to go there… it’s mainly foreign women, they don’t know any better.”
The café, within the context of Peake’s spatial geographic theory, would be included in the
framework of the “city” which is structured patriarchally to seclude women’s movements to just
the domestic sphere. These particular cafés provide a snapshot into traditional modes of spatial
use, as the cafés themselves are older than the new cafés found around Ramallah. The
preservation of these spaces as male-only helps to shed light on the way public space was formed
54

to ensure women’s exclusion to the domestic sphere. Traditionally, shame was used as a mode of
boundary setting in order to ensure women’s seclusion to the domestic sphere.
In Ramallah, families control the spaces that their daughters are allowed to occupy,
particularly when it comes to economic and educational opportunities. This can be equated to
societal regulations on spaces women are allowed to occupy. As I stated above, younger women
are now expected to receive a formal education to advance their economic opportunities. Young
women are now told that they must receive a formal education. As Adely (2012) points out,
many women who do seek out educational opportunities do so in the hopes of securing a more
advantageous marriage. Theoretically, an education should be a gateway for a young woman in
Palestine to enter the public sphere in a legitimate manner, devoid of shame. However, this does
not always seem to be the case. Women are still being confined to the domestic sphere and
responsible for a majority of the unpaid domestic labor in Palestine. Even after they receive their
educations, women are not being seen as worthy of entering the public sphere.
It can be said that even with the efforts of obtaining an education to enter the public
sphere, women still have to concede to shame ideologies regarding where they can go to get an
education. Women are told by their families that they are only allowed to seek educational
opportunities if said opportunities are close to home. One woman named Nadia, who is a 30year-old Muslim from Jerusalem, stated that her family was open to her traveling to another
country for her to receive an education. She equated her family’s lack of spatial boundaries to
open-mindedness. She said: “My family is open minded, yanni, open minded. I don’t do
anything. They let me travel, they let me study in a different country. They trust me and I don’t
do anything wrong.” She then indicated that although her family is fine with her traveling,
society is not. It is shameful/eib for a woman to travel and live away from her family if she is not
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married. Nadia expressed her thoughts on social spatial restrictions when I asked her how eib
impacts her life. She stated: “Sometimes, it’s regrets. [she regrets having to hide parts of her life]
Like sometimes when I travel, I don’t tell very many people because I know how their ideas are.
I know if I just travel, I try not to say anything or share on Facebook, to avoid their comments.”
Women’s use of public urban spaces, or lack of use more specifically, can be seen in
itself as a spatial expression of patriarchy (Peake 1993). Peake argues that the form of patriarchy
shifts depending on time and place. However, the crux of her argument, which builds on the
work of Borsa (1990), revolves around what she refers to as “politics of location.” Peake’s
interpretation of the politics of location is that the “places and spaces we inherit and occupy
which frame our lives in very specific concrete ways, are as much a part of our psyches as they
are a physical or geographical placement” (Peake 1993, 420). A place takes on the collective
thought of a group of people, meaning that an ideological thought that occurs within the group
therefore reflects itself on the space they occupy.
This theoretical framework can be seen in the use of public space in Palestine. In
Ramallah, women are able to use public space; however, that use is dependent on the time of
day. Every woman I spoke to indicated that it is considered shameful for women to be out when
it is dark. For older women, the restriction on space when they were younger would sometimes
extend to certain public places during the daytime. Farha (74 years old, Ramallah) stated that
when she was younger, she could not go to shared public spaces, such as the cinema, without
being accompanied by a male member of her family. The practice of being accompanied by a
man in public spaces has shifted only slightly for women. In the daytime, women now are able to
travel within the city with more ease; however, once it begins to get dark, women are expected to
be accompanied by either their male family members or a group of other women. They are never
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to travel at night alone. This is an important aspect of spatial relations to recognize in terms of
shame ideology because public space embodies gendered ideals. Space, in this sense, is male
bodied and in order for women to access it, they must be granted access by a male bodied
individual. When women are in these patriarchal spaces, as Peake phrases it, then they become
an object that can be claimed by the natural inhabitants of that space, i.e. men. The fear for
women’s safety in public spaces at night directly correlates with the fear of the possibility that
young women will use that space to interact with men whom they should not. People fear that
their daughters and nieces will become objects that the patriarchal public space will use.
Before I begin to delve into this next section, I want to explain its importance and
connection to eib in the connect of space. As I stated before, the women whom I spoke to all
came from different villages in Palestine. Although they all live in Ramallah now, the ways in
which they were raised were influenced primarily by the villages where they grew up. Each
village had its own unique set of social expectations and since the village one grows up in is
instrumental to women’s identity, so too is the social and political thinking of that village. As
women from different villages moved to Ramallah, they brought with them the ways which they
think and experience eib. Due to their understanding of eib coming from their upbringing, and
the fact that many of them still have a lot of family back in their home villages, women
expressed to me how eib in Ramallah is very different from eib in their village. One of the
differences they mentioned had to do with spatial relations and eib. In this case, the politics of
space that Peake discusses is also applicable when examining the way that Ramallah differs from
other villages in Palestine. As I stated above, Ramallah is considered an “open city,” a city where
anyone has the ability to find success. It was pointed out by women that Ramallah was different
from their home villages, particularly Nablus and Khalil (Hebron). Though both Nablus and
57

Khalil (Hebron) are three times the size of Ramallah in both landmass and population, these two
villages are considered less advanced than Ramallah. This is where the politics of location is
essential to understand. The mentality and philosophy of the people in both Nablus and Khalil
(Hebron) is that of an older generation. They very much adhere to traditional modes of
Palestinian thinking and that mode of thinking has become “as much a part of [their] psyches as
they are a physical or geographical placement” (Peake 1993, 420). Therefore, spaces in the
context of Nablus and Khalil (Hebron) are not the same as the space in Ramallah. However, I
feel it is important to point out that the difference in space between Ramallah, Nablus, and Khalil
(Hebron) concerns mostly public spaces. Domestic spaces, or spaces that women are usually
contained to, are comparatively similar among the three places.
Expanding on Peake’s work, Gibson-Graham (1996) take a feminist approach to
understanding class and social relations regarding space and its use. They state that “class
defined as a social process is associated with particular ways of theorizing both society and
political subjectivity… society is typically theorized as a homogenously or hegemonically
capitalist formation centered on an industrial economy, with class theorized as a social relation
originated at that center” (Gibson-Graham 1996, 57). When examining women’s spaces through
the lens of capitalistic relations as the primary mode social reproduction, one realizes that
women therefore are not vessels of social creation. Women are not deemed important enough to
be producers of social relations because they are often delegated to the household or “domestic
spaces.” Public spaces are inherently masculine, and the domestic sphere can therefore be
considered inherently feminine. Women have been categorized within the domestic class which
has “produced a surplus [of] labor in the form of use values that considerably exceed what she
would produce if she were living by herself” (Gibson-Graham 1996, 66). Women produce
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almost all of the unpaid labor force, making their contributions to social production invisible
because only the paid labor force, according to some theorists, account for the total social and
cultural production within a certain society. However, women are in turn affected by the
decisions of the larger patriarchal capitalistic structure, which is, by virtue of its design, meant to
keep women oppressed and in a place that men and the patriarchy deem suitable.
Palestinian women’s changing role in the 21st century has presented challenges that
previously did not exist. The expectation that Palestinian women continue to be the keepers of
the domestic sphere and now active participants in the public sphere has forced women into a
constant tug of war. Their responsibilities in the domestic sphere, to domestic spaces, are seen to
be women’s unwavering first priority. However, as I will explain further in the next chapter, the
economic crisis that exists in Palestine has forced women to enter the work force to help support
their families. Yet, most jobs that women will work, particularly in Ramallah, exist solely within
the public sphere, or the masculine sphere. As I stated above, it has been considered eib for
women to enter the public sphere without being accompanied by a male relative. Yet, since more
women have to work, this has slightly changed, but not without the understanding of which
public spaces women are allowed to enter. Women are often told which jobs are deemed
acceptable for women to take: often, certain jobs are considered eib for women because they are
considered “male” jobs, meaning that the physical spaces where those jobs are performed are
considered masculine. This also ties closely with the type of education a woman is allowed to
pursue, specifically, which degrees are considered acceptable for a young woman.
Peake’s third point is that “inequalities are deeply embedded in the design and
organization of urban spaces, embodied, as they are, not only in the sexual division of labour in
the family (and in waged employment) but also in the system of urban settlement planning and
59

various state policies, such as the provision of child care” (Peake 1993, 417). Women are
responsible for the reproductive labor power in both the home and the community. They also
have to keep relations between agencies of collective consumption, such as health and welfare,
and housing (Peake 1993, 147). In particular, Palestinian women are responsible for the physical
wellbeing of their children, particularly their daughters.
Bodies as Space
Another aspect that Gibson-Graham focus their attention on is the idea of bodies as
spaces. They state that “feminists exploring the social construction of the female body have
questioned the centrality of the phallus, or its lack, in governing the actions of the embodied
subjects” (Gibson-Graham 1996, 95). feminist geographers further examined how the female
body has been a subject of the patriarchal spatial control. Female bodies are made into social
sites that are subject to the scrutiny of patriarchal ideologies. I found this to be especially true for
women in Palestine. Women’s bodies are just as much spaces that dictated by shame ideology as
the larger spaces around them. Thinking about women as space allows for a better understanding
of how ideology their lives physically. As well, they are seen as pliable modes of social elevation
for men in society because they are providing the means and support for continuing a capitalistic
society. Gibson-Graham explain that one’s body is a social location which a “multitude of social,
political, physiological, and discursive practices” can be interpreted (Gibson-Graham 1996, 96).
Palestinian women’s identities are comprised of all the struggles that surround them. The social,
political, and physiological, and discursive practices allow for differing interpretations of the
Palestinian women’s physical person by differing parties. For example, within Palestinian
society, women are often referred to as a part of the landscape. Girls are named after villages and
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landmarks to further make the connection between women as physical spaces for which meaning
can be ascribed.
Every woman I spoke to indicated that their bodies were governed by shame ideologies.
They stated that they do not have control over what they can do with their bodies because there
are always rules and regulations that will immediately stop them from straying away from social
norms. Particularly, women’s bodies are regulated through shame by dictating what they can or
cannot wear. Women’s clothing choices must specifically cater to the ideology of society. If they
do not, then women are unable to move through public spaces because their individual choice
goes directly against what the patriarchal structures deem as admissible.
For instance, Abeer told me a story of how she one time posted a photo of herself on the
internet. She said that one of her aunts deemed that her outfit was inappropriate and decided to
call Abeer’s mother to promptly let her know. Abeer’s mother began to message her after she
had a conversation with her aunt because Abeer’s choice in outfit had created a huge problem for
the family. They believe that the outfit was “too revealing,” therefore Abeer was shamed because
she made the incorrect choice about how her body could be presented in a public (online) space.
The idea that shame is attached to what a woman puts on her body has existed for a long time.
Older generations of women expressed that when they were growing up, women and girls were
not allowed to wear anything that was masculine in nature, such as pants. Women would wear
either western style dresses or traditional Palestinian garb, such as a thobe. As time went on,
what women put on their bodies has shifted, yet there are always limitations. Women’s bodies,
therefore, can be viewed as spaces in which patriarchal ideals are imposed. Women’s movement
in space, and subsequently as space, is directed by the concept of eib. Eib creates and negotiates
which space is deemed acceptable and how that space can be interpreted and used.
61

Conclusion
With this chapter I explored the idea that eib ideology is closely connected to the concept
of social spatial production. Palestinian women have traditionally been limited to an existence in
the domestic sphere because the public sphere was limited to just men. Although this is
changing, as I will show in the next chapter, women are still expected to negotiate their existence
in the public sphere. Eib has been used as a tool to keep women in the domestic sphere, as well
as a means to limit women’s participation in the public sphere today. I also used this chapter to
explain how women’s bodies can be viewed as spaces in which patriarchal ideals are imposed.
Women’s movement in space, and subsequently as space, is directed by the concept of eib.
Women as space within the context of eib ideology means that women’s bodies are also spaces
in which meaning is ascribed. Eib creates and negotiates which space is deemed acceptable and
how that space can be interpreted and used. In this next chapter, I will explore how eib ideology
has changed generationally.
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CHAPTER IV
GENERATIONAL CHANGES
When I began to plan this thesis, even when it was just an idea, I knew that it was
important to touch upon the ways which shame has changed for different generations of
Palestinian women. I came to this conclusion for a variety of reasons, the first being from my
own lived experiences. As a first-generation Palestinian born in America, I am very aware that
each generation of women in my family (me, my mother, and my grandmother) thinks about
shame in different ways. Even though we all have the same basis of thinking about shame, since
we are all Palestinian and each generation taught the next what eib is, we still interpret it in
different ways. I also decided to study shame ideology through the lens of generational changes
because all scholarship I read related to shame ideology never looked at the ways in which it
shifts and changes. I think this is a huge oversight because if the shifts in shame ideology aren’t
paid the proper attention, then gendered relations in Palestine will not make sense. What
solidified my belief in this approach was when I went to Ramallah for an internship in the
summer of 2018. The women I talked to during this time talked about the changes between
generations frequently and cited it as an important aspect of Palestinian culture to understand.
As I stated in the introduction of this thesis, one of the main objectives of this research is
to understand how and why shame ideologies in Palestine shifted across time and how do these
shifts affect different generations of women in different ways. With this chapter, I intend to show
a few key arenas that shame ideology has shifted in the lives of Palestinian women today. By
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framing this question within a generational lens, I am attempting to show there is an
acknowledged shift between the ways in which each generation both experienced and
experiences shame. It is important to show that shame ideologies are not stagnant within the life
of an individual woman. Within a woman’s lifetime, she will experience varying degrees of
responsibility to adhere to eib ideologies. As women age, their position within their community
shifts to one of more authority. With this position, older women are allowed to experience a
reprieve of sorts, as there are few, if any, people who are allowed to enforce eib ideology to
them. However, they also take on a more active role in dispensing eib ideology to younger
generations, as they are now seen as matriarchs in their families. Shame for Palestinian women
not only shifts depending on one’s age but also because of the time period and social
consciousness which one lives in. It is essential to understand this because without the
acknowledgement that eib ideology shifts (or even the acknowledgement that eib exists), any
future attempt to understand the lives of women in Palestine would be outdated and futile.
Globalization
When I asked women from all age groups why they think eib ideology is changing,
almost every single woman brought up the idea of globalization. Some use the term specifically
and others alluded to it. A woman named Nadia, who is 30 years old and from Jerusalem, stated
she does believe that eib ideology is changing. I pressed by asking her why she thinks that is,
more specifically. As she sat across from me, she studied my face for a moment with her eyes
squinted, thinking and nodding her head. As she began to speak in a tone that indicated she was
thinking through all of her words, she stated, “Globalization… They [women] think, they are
reviewing the ideas and they are seeing [women are acknowledging past understanding of eib
and looking at how those ideas impact their own lives]. Also, the older ideas and ways of
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controlling people wasn’t accepted that much, but there was reasons to obey the rules. But now
the concept of freedom… People believe in it and they think about everything now. So they try
not to judge everything.” With this statement, Nadia demonstrates that through various forms of
access, such as technology, women in Palestine have the ability to connect and engage with more
western ideologies.
This exposure allows them to reevaluate their daily lives through another lens. However,
that does not mean that women in Palestine agree with or strictly adhere to western modes of
thinking. On the contrary, women in Palestine use globalized ideas of feminism and women’s
empowerment and meld them into their own understanding of the world. The idea of “freedom”
that Nadia discusses is a product of the conflated existence of both western and traditional
Palestinian imagination. The way that “freedom” is defined in this instance is very important. It
is important to acknowledge that “freedom” does not necessarily mean the same thing for all
women everywhere. Saba Mahmood (2001) explores the notion of freedom and how it has been
framed by liberal feminist scholarship as “negative freedom” or “positive freedom.” Mahmood
explains that liberal feminist scholars refer to “negative freedom” as “the absence of external
obstacles to self-guided choice and action” and “positive freedom” as “the capacity to realize an
autonomous will, [which is] fashioned in accord with the dictates of ‘universal reason’ or ‘selfinterest’” (Mahmood 2001, 207). However, she points out that with each of these definitions of
freedom the individual actions are required to be the result of her “own will.” as opposed to
being the product of “customs, traditions, or direct coercion” (Mahmood 2001, 207). Mahmood
points out that it is important to acknowledge that self-realization is not a liberal invention and is
something that has existed in pre-modern history in many forms (Mahmood 2001, 207). So,
although they are influenced by western ideologies to some extent, women in Palestine do not
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strive for a western conception of “freedom.” When women found out I lived in America, they
would often express how they felt that Americans were too individualistic and lacked moral
grounding. From what I was able to gather from their responses, a majority of the women I spoke
with believe that “freedom” for them constituted the ability to get an education, to find a partner
whom they loved, and to get the respect that they give to others.
As such, globalization does not necessarily mean the elimination of eib ideologies. In
fact, globalization has created more nuanced avenues in women’s lives that bring new meanings
and interpretations to eib ideology. Some practices that the west considers “female liberation”
are explicitly looked down upon by Palestinian women of all age groups. Younger women are
more sympathetic and receptive to western modes of thinking; however, they still abide by eib
ideology because they realize that they live in a society that puts priority on one’s ability to
adhere to tradition.
The women I interviewed also expressed that they look to other Arab countries to help
shape their worldview. I found that women were more willing to follow what other Arab
countries do more closely than they would countries that are considered more “developed.”
When I asked her specifically about why her thoughts on eib has changed, Nadia stated:
For me, I was all the time thinking about that [eib] but now I can express myself. Before,
no; we just learn from parents, from school, from society. But when we get older, we
think about all of the things we learned about and everything in our environment,
everything is changing. Actually, the last 10 years…I think... what has happened in the
Arab countries. All the Arab countries around us; everything is changing. So, this was
associated [with eib], yanni, it comes with revolution. I notice... I have noticed, I have
friends from Jordan, from different Arab countries. There is all the time, conferences and
discussions. There is all the time discussions of what we used to be; what we can’t
discuss, but discussing everything.
Andrea: So, do you think that it was more of this change in the Arab world that had
created this change with eib?
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Nadia: Hmm, yes, like changing everything eib. It’s like [people are] thinking about
everything. Yanni, reviewed and discussed and rational thinking is working now. Yanni,
“why is this eib,” this used to be eib but now no. They treat it before as eib. If it’s really
eib and wrong, we still saying it’s eib. But like I told you, freedom and thinking, logic
and globalization, many things are changing the ideas.
What Nadia is saying in this statement is that there is a constant flow of ideas among the various
Arab countries and this has a lot to do with the revolutions associated with both the Arab Spring
and the general cultural revolutions that have taken place throughout the Middle East.
Globalization has allowed for more ease of communication, particularly through technological
advancement, which I will discuss below.
Technology
While Palestinians have stayed up to date with technological advancements, I found that
there are two pieces of technological invention that have had the largest impact on eib ideology.
The first is the internet, which is the reason that people in Palestine have quick access to
globalizing ideas. The second is the mobile phone. Ilahiane (2019) argues that the mobile phone
is “an invaluable vehicle for inverting and suspending ordinary gender roles and placemaking
practices” (Ilahiane 2019, 55). I found that this is true, as many of the women I spoke to
expressed how the mobile phone has changed their everyday lives in a variety of ways. In
today’s cultural landscape, very few people use flip phones, and the women in Ramallah were no
exception. When the mobile phone was brought up, women were unequivocally talking about the
smart phone. The smart phone has transformed the production of eib in ways that the flip phone
was never able: the ability for anyone to carry a small computer in their pocket has made it easier
for people to interact both with one another and with previously unattainable content. In this
sense, smartphones have transformed the space and place which shame occurs and has allowed
for an alternative mode of transmission of cultural and social ideals. As I will show later in this
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section, the virtual world that the exists within the smartphone duplicates and reconfigures
existing social boundaries. Ilahiane points out that the cell phone is not necessarily just an object
in this case but something else that “constitute multi-vectored places” (Ilahiane 2019, 55). For
the women I spoke to, their phones were windows to the world outside of Palestine. Particularly
because of the apartheid, their phones allow them to communicate with family and friends
around the country (or other countries) whom they cannot see in person due to blockades and
travel restrictions from the Israeli government. Their phones therefore create a new space in
which they can interact without the barriers of the apartheid.
Due to the privacy that a cell phone provides for an individual, older generations often
view the devices as opportunities for eib waiting to happen. With the ubiquity of smart phones,
parents nowadays do not know exactly what their children are doing or whom they are talking to,
so there is the assumption that they are participating in behavior that would be considered eib.
For example, parents think that a cell phone allows their girls to talk with boys in private, which
in the physical world would be considered eib. This anxiety was particularly acute for Reema, a
38-year-old from Khalil (Hebron), who is illiterate. Her concerns for her daughter, who is around
14 years old, centered around her daughter’s use of her cell phone. She stated (translated by
interpreter):
Her daughter uses the phone a lot in the evening, even until 3am and she didn’t know
about [it], and so many times she caught her and she took the phone. But she can’t read or
write, so she didn’t know what she was doing on the phone. So, the next day her daughter
was afraid she would tell her father. So, she asked her “what were you doing?” and she
said she was writing stories and sharing them. She is not talking to anybody. She
explained to her that this is wrong because this may lead her to talking with somebody
and loving somebody and so it’s not acceptable that she stays late and talks to anyone,
even if she is just writing stories and sharing them because she is not sure what she is
going to do. And she told her husband too that she likes to read and writes stories. But
she didn’t again let her take the phone or stay up late. She doesn’t want [her] to listen to
anything wrong. She is protecting her because she is just 14 years old. She doesn’t want
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this to lead to her knowing anyone or doing something wrong or taking pictures on the
phone and sending pictures.
Reema’s illiteracy creates more anxiety around shame for her daughter because she does not
have the ability to fully know what her daughter is doing on her phone. The fear she has of the
unknown forces her to assume that her daughter will do something wrong, thereby shaming her
for potential actions. A 21-year-old woman from Khalil (Hebron) named Noura expressed
sentiments that conveyed similar thoughts. We were discussing how she thinks of shame in
different ways than her mother and grandmother. She held up her phone to me and stated,
This phone, for my grandmother it is shame to use it as a girl, under certain age, it’s
shame to use it. For my mom, its ok. But, um, if your age over 15 or 16 it’s ok to use it,
but under this level [age] it is shame for my mother. But for me it is ok, there is no
problem. It’s useful on our life. So, everybody can use…they are afraid, girls, call some
guys at night, or be in a relationship. [They will say] Ok, it’s shame, don’t give her a
mobile. But they only think about the negative things that could come from it.”
Technology has also reinvented the ways that young women combat shame ideology
through their use of social media. One night during my fieldwork, I was sitting with a group of
women on a balcony drinking tea. I was at one of my aunt’s houses, so my visit did not
necessarily have to do with my fieldwork, and I was just enjoying the company of my aunts and
their friends. I was sitting directly next to one of my cousins and about halfway through the night
she let out a laugh and then told me to look at her phone. On it showed a conversation taking
place on Facebook’s messenger app. The conversation was written in Arabic and as my Arabic is
not fluent, I asked her what it said. She explained that she was randomly messaged by a man she
did not know. His messages were sent in an attempt to persuade her to date him. However, once
anyone clicked on his profile, it became very apparent that he was married and had children, and
this was an attempt to cheat on his wife with a younger woman. My cousin laughed again when
she saw my shocked face and simply said “watch this.” She took a screenshot of the conversation
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and opened up an already established message in her app. She attached the photo she took and
began to type furiously. I sat there confused as to what she was doing until she finished typing
and turned to me to explain. She then told me that the group she just sent the message to was
comprised of young women who all attend the local university. This group message’s specific
objective is to expose the married men who message them. When a married man messages
anyone in the group, the woman who was messaged attaches the conversation and ask if anyone
knows him and his family. The women in the group then use these messages and warning for
themselves and their friends to avoid this man and they will also message the man’s family to let
them know what he was up to. From what I saw, this group was comprised of hundreds of
women.
In this instance, young women are able to use social media to circumvent any attempts of
future shame on their part. Due to their ability to save conversations on their phones, women can
provide proof that will automatically exonerate them from any accusations that they were
participating in shameful behavior. The existence of technology that allows women to instantly
communicate with one another is unique to this day and age. Technology has allowed for the
creation of a new space these women can inhabit. However, I believe something that can be
overlooked in this case is how young women’s use of new technology actually mimics the older
ways that women communicated with one another in the past. Traditionally, women would
gather with one another to discuss improprieties in the community by going to one house where
they would have tea or help prepare meals (Abu-Lughod 1986; Gorkin and Othman 1996).
Younger women, with the help of technology, have extended that traditional meet-up to a digital
level. Technology has been a crucial element in the shifting of shame ideologies in the lives of
Palestinian women. It allowed for the reimagination of the platform which monitoring and
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enforcement of shame takes place. Women now have the ability to stop the possibility of their
own shame from happening. Yet, technology also creates a new space that shame can attach
itself. This has a lot to do with the anonymity which technology allows its user to obtain. In other
words, technology has allowed for both the reinforcement and resistance of shame ideologies.
Education
Education, particularly access to education for girls, has shifted drastically in Palestine
within the last 100 years. Previously, girls were not expected or allowed to receive an education
as their obligations were centered around marriage and family affairs. Young girls who did have
to fortune of obtaining an education often were from wealthy families. Fida Adely (2012)
explores the way that school systems have changed for women and girls in the Middle East.
Although Adely examines the daily life of school aged girls in Jordan (many of the families she
discussed in her book are Palestinian-Jordanian), I believe her analysis is also applicable to
Palestine. She states that the shift in education practices has a lot to do with the urbanization that
has occurred in the region for the past century. This urbanization has led to an increase in
educational opportunities for both men and women, which in turn has led to the increase of roles
for women in public institutions and spaces (Adely 2012, 50).
I found that the most interesting aspect about education in Palestine is that there was a
collective consensus as to the statistics of individuals who obtain an education. Every person I
spoke to, both men and women, all expressed that 95% of the Palestinian population is educated.
The specificity of the percentage was what I found most interesting. Whenever education was
brought up, it was almost an automatic fact that everyone was trained to say. I’m not particularly
sure where this number comes from, but due to its specific nature, I theorize that there must be
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literature passed amongst Palestinians that comes from some political organization, possibly the
Palestinian Authority.
Although this number does seem extraordinarily high, I do believe that there is a drastic
difference as to the number of individuals who completed their education than in previous
generations. According to the United Nations, the number of Palestinian youths enrolling in
school has increased 940% from 1993 to 2011 (Koni, Aida et al. 2012, 2328). It is also estimated
that the number of Palestinians attending higher education institutions has exponentially
increased. It is reported that the “estimated number of students attending HEI [higher education
institutions] in 1993 was 22,750 [and] it rose into 213,973 in 2011” (Koni, Aida et al. 2012,
2328). From that number of students, 57% of them were female (Koni, Aida et al. 2012; Nicolai
2007). I believe it is safe to assume that the number of students has increased from 2011 as a
larger emphasis on education has been pushed onto the social consciousness of Palestinians. In
women who were 65 years and older, women were told that they were not allowed to go to
school because that was not their role. It was considered eib for a woman to put her education
before her marriage prospects. As women were expected to marry at a young age in that
generation, women had to be home, learning from their mothers and preparing for married life.
However, often women did not even have the choice to get an education as their families would
forbid it. Jamileh, a 30-year-old Muslim woman from Khalil (Hebron), told me that, in Khalil, it
used to be considered eib for a girl to go to university because there are men there. Now, women
go to university without the fear of being stopped because of the presence of men. Education
now is seen as something that is vital to the development of young women. A young woman who
has an education is seen to have better marriage prospects than a woman who does not. If a
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family has educated children, then in the eyes of the community, they are respectable and seen as
economically stable.
However, the effort to obtain an education still presents many challenges for women. The
desire to receive an education, even with its elevated status society, does not necessarily matter
all of the time. Particularly when schooling forces a girl to travel some distance, families deem
education non-essential. A girl or young woman traveling alone, regardless of the purpose of the
travel, is seen as eib. Girls and women traveling alone presents a security problem for many
families. If something happens to her, then it is her fault because she was alone, and women
should know that being alone in the streets is not acceptable. As well, many families believe that
if a woman is left alone, she will automatically participate in behavior that is considered eib, like
meeting with men. Noura told me a story of one of her cousins who lives in a refugee camp near
Jericho. He cousin, who is a girl around high school age, wanted to attend school. However, the
school she would attend was in another village outside of the refugee camp. Her brothers told her
that she could not go to school because she would have to go to the center of the city where the
school was located. Her family forced her to stay at home and relinquish her ability to receive
and education for the sole reason that women are not allowed to travel alone and there was no
one available to take her to and from school every day. The restrictions on traveling to school is
something that Adely (2012) explained as a precaution parents and families in Jordan take to
ensure that the respectability of their daughters is upheld.
Not being able to travel to receive an education was a concern that most women brought
up. A 20-year-old Muslim woman named Haneen from Jerusalem told me about her experience
with this. She is one of nine children, to which is in the middle and her older siblings are all
boys. Her older brothers were allowed to leave Palestine to peruse their higher education in other
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countries in both Europe as well as in the United States. Haneen attends one of the local
universities, but she told me when she was in high school her parents explicitly promised her that
she could also leave Palestine to attend university. However, during her last year of high school
they had a change of heart. It was the point where she already received a full scholarship to a
university in Turkey that they told her she was not allowed to go. They decided, because she is a
young, unmarried woman, she should not be in another country alone. They were afraid of what
other people would say about the family because it is eib for women to live away from their
families before marriage. Women do not have a choice in the matter because it is considered eib
for women to go against their family after they already decided on something.
Even when women can get a university education, the subject that they choose to study
also affects their standing in society. Another 20-year old name Yasmine (Ramallah) discussed
how her family does not like that she has chosen to study English at the local university. She said
that her father wanted her to become a lawyer, but she had no desire to pursue that career.
However, it was her mother who stood up for her and supported her decision to study English. I
found that women’s success in receiving an education often occurred because of the efforts of
her mother. If a young woman’s mother did not support her daughter going to school, then
typically the daughter would not go to school. Muna told me about her own experience with this
as both an individual and as a mother.
They always complained about, you know, me deciding and telling them, not the other
way around. But that’s how they got to see me developing and how my life changed and
now after getting married, my children like the way they are. Like my youngest girl, she
went to school in Cyprus, she studied there. So, people were telling me, “how could you
send her? She’s still in 9th grade.” And my other daughter was doing her B.A. in the
States. “What a mother,” they said to me, “to give up, you only have two daughters!
She’s so young!” I said yes, this is better for her. I’m giving her more opportunities. I
said I don’t care! If I were to stop them because society did not accept my daughters, at
such an age because she’s a girl. I said, “I’m her mother, I’m her mother.” I know what to
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do. I know what’s good for her and I’m happy that the result is rewarding in the end, and
to encourage many others. So, sending your daughter away does not mean you’re giving
[taking away] all of the support. You know as a mother you take care of her despite the
fact that she’s away, you check on her. You let her sort her own character; her own
personality. And she turned out to be a successful person in the end. So, everyone, I’m
sure, they want their children to be that way. It’s the technique. You accept what society
will say or if they will point at you. So, it’s up to you to decide. That’s what I keep telling
everyone. It’s you who decides. You should not wait for the society to give you go for
your right, you ask for it, if you wait for it. Rights are not given, they are taken.
In the beginning of this vignette, Muna explained to me that she often would question the things
that her parents would tell her were eib. She believes that if a woman wants to do something that
will better her life, then she should do it. This sentiment is not very easy for many women in
Palestine, which is something Muna acknowledged, and the backlash she received is all too
common an occurrence for Palestinian woman. Women who allow their daughters to take
advantage of educational opportunities outside the country are often questioned about their
abilities as a mother. They are told they obviously do not care for their daughters or their wellbeing because no self-respecting Palestinian mother would allow her daughter to leave home for
an education. As I stated before, it is considered eib for unmarried women to live on their own
even in the same city where their parents live, so allowing one’s daughter to leave the country to
live is deemed unthinkable. However, as Muna indicated at the end of the vignette, her decision
to allow her daughters to study in other countries has influenced the perceptions of people
around her. Her case showed that her daughters turned out fine and because of their opportunities
abroad, they became well-rounded, respectable women.
As I stated above, many young women are shamed by their families for the educational
degree they choose to pursue. When I asked her if she thinks there are different expectations
when it comes to women and men in Palestinian society, Zahwa recounted a story about her
niece that perfectly encompassed this dilemma.
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Of course! Even education. For instance [points at her husband], his brother, he has a girl.
She got in a very good school actually. So, she wanted to study agriculture engineering.
They refused... they not refused, they “convinced” her that this is not good for women.
Which is, I thought, nonsense because you want to go to the farm, you have farmers,
farmers are outside of the city, these aspects. Also another thing, his [her husband] sister
Hanan, she has a girl and she wanted to be a lawyer and they convinced her that law is
not good for women. Why? So these are some things that are imposed and sometimes
they say “Ahh we didn’t pressure her, we didn’t say don’t go.” But they did their best to
convince her that this is wrong and this is not good for her. Which is imposing things on
her. In a direct way, tell her, “No, this is not good. You will not find a job easily, men
take all the jobs, and you’ll pay less” and so on and so on. You’re convinced, “Oh, this is
not good, I’ll be a teacher, its safer.” Even though she is clever. But there is a lot of… but
there are judges now and inspectors. A lot of brave women. These are things that
indirectly draw your road, draw you to things that you don’t need, you don’t want, and
even don’t achieve. When you go to study other things. You may not achieve the career
you wanted or dreamed of. Why?
Interference from a woman’s family will dictate her future. Women are told by their families that
certain subjects of study are eib and therefore they need to pick something else to pursue. It is
important to point out that although there has been a major transformation as to the way
Palestinians think about education for women, there are still limitations that do not allow women
to pursue certain educational paths. However, as Zahwa points out in the vignette above, as more
women pursue their own educational direction the more exposure certain paths will receive,
therefore taking away the fear that families feel. Once a woman can point to another successful
Palestinian woman doing the job and getting the education she wants, then she is able to show
her family that she too can be successful.
Economy
In this section I will explore the ways women perceive the market as a transformative
mechanism in their lives. Economics has played an intricate role in the changing landscape of
shame ideologies in Palestine. Due to the apartheid, the economic crisis in Palestine has
continued to worsen. The Palestinian labor market is inherently political in nature: “While
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female labor supply is limited (low labor force participation and limited to certain sectors), the
economy’s absorptive capacity is also limited due to the restricted access to Israeli labor markets
and Israeli restrictions on the exportation of Palestinian goods” (Daoud & Shanti 2012, 2). More
young people in Palestine are unemployed than in previous generations. As the market continues
to decrease, young people do not have many prospects for their economic futures. If they want to
participate in the Israeli labor market, then they must obtain a permit to cross through the
checkpoints on a daily basis. This permit is not guaranteed, and it can be taken away at any time.
Therefore, employment is not guaranteed. The uncertainty of employment opportunities puts a
huge strain on the domestic sphere, which is primarily run by women. To characterize this strain,
the World Bank refers to Palestinian households as “shock absorbers,” which are the entities that
absorb economic shocks in the future (Giacaman et al. 2001, 128). The crux of this analysis is
that Palestinian women therefore are the ones who bear the most burden in situations of
displacement. The increased poverty and unemployment amongst Palestinians created a reality
where women became the breadwinners (Giacaman et al 2001, 129).
The increase in women’s education has allowed for them to partake in jobs which were
not traditionally available to them. Traditionally, women in Palestine were expected to stay at
home and take care of the house and their children. All the older women I spoke to indicated that
growing up, they were responsible for helping their mothers with cooking and cleaning. Many of
them did not have access to an education so the jobs that they did find often were unrecognized
within the larger labor force. In smaller villages and refugee camps, this is still a reality for
women today.
Many women come to Ramallah in hoped for better economic opportunities that are not
available in their home village. Both men and women come to Ramallah in pursuit of better
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economic opportunities; however, women in particular have benefited from the economic
freedoms which Ramallah provides. Ramallah’s newfound position as a lucrative metropolitan
area has become somewhat of an oasis to people from villages in the West Bank. Not only does
Ramallah offer women more, albeit marginal, economic opportunities than their village could
provide, it also allows women to have more anonymity and therefore less possibility of shame
associate with one’s work. Some examples of occupations the women I spoke to hold are:
marketing officer, accountant, office assistant, architect, IT specialist, teacher, municipality
community specialist, etc.
I asked most women why they believed Ramallah offered them more opportunities than
their home village. Muna succinctly states that:
Ramallah is a city of diversity, which is a sort of a liberal city, open. There is
openness with a mixture of international. So, the environment, it is becoming more open.
People are becoming more exposed, awareness. Women are taking more leading roles, in
Ramallah in particular. Like if you look at the fact that there are so many NGO’s, so
many women are heads, so this is not the case in other cities because there are not
NGO’s. So, this openness, the environment you live in, is really a positive element and
helpful for women, and helpful for us in Ramallah. That’s why many graduates from the
universities, they try to get some opportunities, to get some internship or work here so
they can check and see if they can stay. It’s a way to be a little bit more free and to
express themselves.
The economic reality in Ramallah and the city’s reputation as an “open city” has become a draw
to many people around the West Bank. As Muna pointed out, many women experience more
economic opportunities than they would in their home villages. During fieldwork, I heard about
many instances of women coming to Ramallah on their own to find work. However, since it is
deemed eib for a woman to live alone, some women will live in apartments with other women in
the same position that they are. This allows for the women to ensure that they are each behaving
appropriately and that they are all safe. Another reason women live in these arrangements is due
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to the high housing prices in Ramallah. Although women find more economic opportunities in
Ramallah, it is still expensive to live in the city.
Leila Farsakh (2016) uses a quote from a conference presentation given by
anthropologist Sherene Seikaly (2014), in which Seikaly professes that “the economy can also be
considered a discrete realm of resistance in the face of political exclusion as much as a locus for
new political configuration that need to be analyzed rather than assumed as neutral” (Farsakh
2016, 56). In the case of Palestinian women, economic independence is used as a means to
reduce the restrictions shame ideologies place on their lives. When women gain economic
independence, or even when women contribute economically to the household, they are able to
negotiate the way they are seen by their family and community. This is especially true when a
woman has an education. An educated woman with a job is seen as a respectable and competent
person in her community. However, this viewpoint is dependent on an individual family’s
personal perspectives. With the economic crisis that is occurring, households would not be able
to sustain themselves if women did not contribute economically. Women entering the economic
market in Palestine now has a lot to do with its current state. This reliance of women’s economic
contributions has a made it possible for Palestinian’s to reimagine shame ideology boundaries.
Although those boundaries still exist for women in many villages, they too are shifting slightly
because of the travel that is required to obtain reliable work. Jamileh told me that many people
from Khalil (Hebron) will come to Ramallah to work and then they will take Ramallah’s idea of
eib back to Khalil where people will internalize it and adapt parts of it.
Inner-Community Change
I found that even with the realization that globalization is impacting traditional shame
ideology, many changes are also coming from internal forces. This internal change could be
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reduced to being a product of the other elements that I mentioned above. However, I found that
these changes have more to do with women’s personal life experiences than anything else.
Jamileh was one of the first women who fully brought this idea to me. We were discussing the
reasons why eib has changed and I asked her if she thinks eib is shifting just because of outside
influence. (Translated by interpreter).
When you travel, and the internet, and the wifi, and the globalization, it has an effect. But
she says something interesting. That in Hebron, they used to make the girls marry like at
14 years old without education and they are experiencing a lot of problems and divorces
and bad effects on the girls themselves. But now, they are experiencing all this, so the
parents are changing. They want to educate their daughters, to be stronger, to not get
married when they are so young. They will go to university, so as they can sustain
themselves and they will be stronger, they can deal with life, with their problems. So, this
is something that affects the eib.
In this vignette, Jamileh indicated that many women who were not able to receive an education
and were married young are now refusing to allow their daughters to live the same life that they
did. Their experiences of being mothers at such a young age, coupled with their inability to
provide for themselves has left them with the hope that their daughters life could be different.
Although they are aware that they are defying traditional shame ideologies and they realize there
will be repercussions from their community, they believe in the end it is important that their
daughters are more self-sufficient than they were.
Two sisters, Nour (25) and Leila (23), whom I met by chance when I went to the café that
Leila owns, told me of their own lived experience with the internal changes to eib. They are from
Nablus and a majority of their family still lives there. Their family in Nablus are very
conservative Muslims, so they both attended a Muslim girl’s school in Nablus. Their mother
Lydia, whom I met and got to spend some time around, was forced to marry the girl’s father
when she was just 14 years old. At the time I met her, Lydia was only 40 years old, meaning she
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had Nour when she was 15 years old. The girls have a brother who is not much younger than
them. Years ago, their parents got a divorce and Lydia experienced extreme shame from her
community: ultimately, they believed that she was the one responsible for the divorce, even
though this was not true. Lydia decided that for the betterment of herself and for a better future
for her kids she would leave Nablus to seek out better opportunities. She moved to Ramallah
where she began to attend the local university and obtained both her bachelors and her master’s
degrees. She is an artist, who has had her work in galleries all around the Arab world. Not only
does she encourage her daughters to pursue whatever life they choose to live, she also is seen as
a mentor for a lot of the other young women in Ramallah. Leila’s café, which Lydia helps her
run, has become a hotspot for young people, particularly young women in Ramallah. Lydia in a
lot of ways has become a mentor to younger women and is an example of how women can
determine for themselves the path their lives take. From her personal experiences and the
hardships she endured, she is vocal about aspects of eib culture that need to change.
Another woman from Nablus named Nabila (21 years old, Muslim), told me how her
mother’s parents were very conservative and strict when it came to eib. Her mother would often
sneak books to read because she wanted to get some form of an education. Just like Lydia,
Nabila’s mother was married young, but Nabila’s parents are still married, and her mother still
lives in Nablus. However, much to the disapproval of her family, Nabila’s mother encouraged
her to move to Ramallah so that she could pursue opportunities that she would never have in
Nablus. Although this decision was made with great cost to herself and her own reputation, she
did this because she wanted her daughter to have an easier life than she has had. Likewise,
Suzanne (30 years old, Jerusalem) told me that younger women in Palestine today are more
willing to push back regarding eib ideology. She said that young women now question
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everything, and they are stronger than the previous generations, hers included. Young women
now will more openly talk to one another about the ways which eib impacts their lives, whereas
in previous generations, women would not bring it up. There is a saying in Arabic that states that
“eib is eib,” meaning that even talking about eib is eib. Although the younger generation still
abides by this rule, when asked, they are more willing to openly talk about eib. Even the
willingness to discuss eib when pressed ensures that more Palestinian women are sharing new
ways of thinking about the practice. The willingness of younger generations to openly discuss
how eib impacts their lives has led to transformation in how women navigate eib ideology in
their daily lives. It allows for a more comparative approach to understanding the system which
they all experience and therefore allows for certain stigmas that exist to transform.
I think the most fascinating way that eib ideology is shifting through inner-community
efforts is from women-led initiatives. Zahwa, who lives in Aboud, told me about a woman’s
group she started in the village. She told me how she would meet with women in the village
whom she was friends with and a lot of them did not have any means for making income because
many of them lack a formal education. Zahwa, who did finish high school and has a good office
job in Ramallah, realized that all of her friends had other skillsets that they could use to help
elevate their economic status. Below I will show a portion of the conversation that took place
between Zahwa and myself.
Zahwa: I know a woman, she used to work, she’s from one village, not this village, and
her father was very bad actually, she was abused. He refused to let her continue the
secondary school even though she was very, very intelligent, she got high scores. He said
no, you need to get married, so he brought a husband for her and he told her this husband
is well educated, he has a degree. She found out that he didn’t even continue his school.
After she married him, this is not the only [thing wrong], he is a follower of his mother
[meaning that he relies a lot on his mother]. And she thought that she imposed on him
and he doesn’t want to give even money and she has 3 children. So, she said to him, I will
go and find a job, raise my children. Then she came and cleaned at the office. But I knew
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her when she was cleaning the office and studying in university. Sometimes I tried to
help her more because she told me her story. She sometimes worked the cafeteria at the
university. Last week, she came to visit me here, and she changed a lot, because she
works now, she has a job, a good job and her children are grown up. She is a different
person because she has continued her education, she has a job, and even her husband, if,
she says, if he doesn’t come to the house, she doesn’t care. She has her own life,
independent. There is a lot [it is a lot], but if she doesn’t do that, she follows her husband,
waited till he brings bread to her house and she doesn’t do any effort, what’s her life it
be? What would her children they be? Even her children are the best in the school now. I
give the women here examples of these women [women who become economically
independent]. They can see that everybody can have an independent life, if she works for
it, if she puts efforts. But in the beginning, she has to be convinced it’s her right to do
that.
Andrea: And that’s the hard part?
Zahwa: This is the hard part. That’s why I work with them on personality now. Last time,
we talked about communication and how its important between woman to woman. Direct
communication. We talked about self-confidence and how we gain self-confidence and
how we use self-confidence. We talked about the different social subjects that impact us
and we give examples…But the most important thing is to value different personalities
and also use the good things of that personality for the sake of the community. So, these
are the subjects that we raise. Sometimes they raise a lot of subjects [hardships] that they
may face. The most important thing is that they are open, that they talk. They talk about
themselves, about the difficulties that they is facing. This is very important because we
are now 17 [her women’s group has 17 members now], and now [they are] talking in
front of me, talking to strangers who come. And talking about themselves in what’s
inside and get it out. So, the most important thing is that you know that there is a problem
then you can fix it. And this is a problem for the women. Sometimes, they blame the
society, they blame the husband, they blame the man. No, its in us, strength is in us, we
just can get it out.
[Later in the conversation she discusses economics can help provide women with more
choices in life, I asked about her collective]
Zahwa: Yes, locally based. Actually, I have a different view, which is that community
can support itself. Even I work with donors but I don’t believe donors will do a lot of
impact. I feel that, I have a nice experience with one of the associations that become an
investor. Because we wanted to have a kitchen here, you know for people, these women
whose [who are] housewives but they want to do catering and cooking and so on. And we
have nothing. So, we went to the organization in Ramallah. And we told them we need
some assistance. Because I think donors impose their own agenda, the community can
support itself. We went ok, we have an idea. Britain and the US started to do auctions for
community work, not auctions for selling. [Zahwa and the women she works with to
implement that idea to their own work]. So they [the Palestinian organization in
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Ramallah] said, can you do a presentation and I said, yes I can. So I did a presentation
about the kitchen, and why we want to do it and the impact on women if they start
working on it, and we got 30,700 shekels. This is the first time, and not a lot of people
came because it was the first experience and then we started to go for companies [local,
Palestinian owned companies] that have, say refrigerators, and say, “please help assist
us” because the community can’t. Somebody gave us an oven and now we have a big
kitchen with no donors. But you know, this is a good approach what I’m doing. Now we
are thinking of having a festival that will be pure community based. You need to change
your thinking, if you still wait until donors give you money, nothing [will happen]. You
need to let people pay not only money. You know, they can pay resources, people can
give training, give things they don’t want; resources. There are places that are closed for
instance that you can open, just have centers or whatever. You can have teenagers and
university students who has a lot of enthusiasm and active, they are sources. These are all
sources you don’t think, it’s not only money. Donors give you money. But with this
money, they need to impose their own agenda.
Andrea: Do you think more people need to look at it like that?
Zahwa: They need to. Look at the US, they took all their money back, look what
happened. But if you had a center here, that your community owns it, your people work,
they work on it, the use it, they put all their efforts in it, nobody can ever threaten it.
Andrea: Do you think that needs to spread more? This mentality? Are you trying to
spread it more to different villages?
Zahwa: We have now. We are going to other villages. There is a village here that has
sabar (cactus fruit/ prickly pears), they have a festival for that on Monday and Tuesday. I
convinced these ladies that I work with to have a small exhibition. And they put all the
things they work on, they work at home sometimes. Some works cooking, embroidery,
whatever they do. And then they have seven tables. Yesterday, I was meeting them,
telling them how we need to [market], not only market, we need to do it in a certain way.
How to package it, how to label it. I tried to explain to them a lot of examples [samples]
on the internet and agreed on what the want to do and give them ideas on how to do
it…they have two project ideas that we have, we’re going to work on it, without any
donors. There is, I don’t know if you heard of it, about a [farm], its [in a village near] the
wall. [a Palestinian man and woman] wanted to protect that land so he started to plant and
to work on that land so [they] started to plant and to work on that land. I took the ladies
two weeks ago to that village. They were clever to plant seasonal plants and what they
have done is very important because they went to, for instance, ten people, 20 people and
went “we are growing these plants which are organic and we’re trying to support the land
and the farmers near-by,” because now they use the farmers. They give them whatever
plants and they plant for them. they do a basket with seasonal [food]. You just have to
pay 100 shekels for a month and every week you get to your door. You support the other
farmers because these crops and you do something else, carrots or whatever, and we put
it in that basket. Give you money, and you do the effort in your land. You see, so now
they have a waiting list. From nothing! That means that the community can come
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together and support each other. So these are examples, I took the ladies there and said
look how clever they are; they think creatively. I’m convinced of that approach. And if
you do that, sooner or later, the donors will be gone. And you need community programs,
projects, because we do not have a government here. If people say we have one, this is a
lie I think people have the same approach now…It’s not just you have an idea, you need a
network. For instance, if I want to do a project now, at least 50% will be with me. At
least. So, if you want to so something, you need a network, then work. You can’t do a
project without networking, without a base, its nonsense.
I share this lengthy conversation between myself and Zahwa because it truly exemplifies
how women in Palestine are beginning to support one another in an economic and social sense in
order to help continually shift eib ideologies in their lives. Zahwa’s women’s collective has
created a new space which women are able to openly discuss eib ideologies A space of this
nature has not traditionally existed within Palestinian society in part because women were told
that it was eib to discuss eib. As I stated earlier, eib ideologies are beginning to shift because of a
more open mode of communication. Zahwa said that her group does not have an age limit, so the
women who partake in the collective come from a range of ages and generations. Therefore,
women of all ages have the ability to learn and grow from one another. Zahwa and the women in
the collective are also using both education and, more specifically, economics to help transform
eib ideologies. By obtaining the resources for women to pursue projects that help build capital,
this collective is able to erase past stigma attached to women entering the economic sphere. As
well, many of the women, particularly those over 40, did not have full access to a formal
education, therefore they do not have the skills to enter the formal workforce. The objective of
this collective is to help women in that specific situation. Even without a formal education, every
woman has a skill set which can be monetized. Zahwa said that in its beginnings, the collective
would cater food because many of the women were exceptional cooks and wished to earn money
from cooking. As more women joined, more skills were being utilized. For example, some
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women were skilled at tatreez (Palestinian embroidery), others make soap, or decorations; it
truly depends on each women’s skillset. With Zahwa’s help, women in Aboud are beginning to
become more financially independent. However, the truly unique aspect of this effort is that
these women are transforming the way they think of themselves and other women around them
through entrepreneurship. For Zahwa and all of her friends, this experience is just as much about
dispelling and transforming the ideologies of shame in their lives just as much as it is about
money. As shame is often passed from woman to woman, community initiatives that allow
women to openly discuss their feeling are essential for the transformation of shame. Without
open communication and encouragement, these transformations would not be possible.
Conclusion
The objective of this chapter was to showcase the various ways which eib ideology has
shifted and transformed among different generations of Palestinian women. I framed this
analysis in a generational lens because I found that it was important to understand that shame is a
transformative phenomenon that, even within a single woman’s life, takes on different forms of
embodiment and meaning. I chose to focus on five specific arenas of globalization, technology,
education, economy and inner-community change because I found that these were the areas
which all women indicated there has been significant change to eib ideology in Palestinian
society.
Globalization has allowed for Palestinians to see other countries, particularly other Arab
countries, ideas and customs, which then allowed for Palestinians to implement elements they
favored into their own lives. Therefore, certain traditional Palestinian customs that were closely
related to eib ideology have been transformed or viewed through a new lens. One such product
of globalization is the implementation of technology, particularly the smartphone, in the daily
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lives of Palestinian women. With new technological advancements, women now have the ability
to stop the possibility of their own shame from happening. As I highlighted in the chapter above,
technology also creates a new space that shame can attach itself.
The transformation of education is an important topic to discuss when understanding
generational changes to eib ideology. Older women did not have the opportunity, nor the
infrastructure, to attend school and school was considered eib for young girls and women. Now,
school us seen as vital to the development of Palestinian girls and women. This is in part because
a woman who is educated is seen as a status symbol within the community. As well, women who
have educations have an easier time finding a partner to marry and are seen as more desirable
than those women who do not have an education. Since in Palestinian society a good marriage is
the ultimate goal for a young woman, families are taking every precaution to ensure that their
daughters marry. However, women’s education is also essential for women to enter the
workforce, which is something that is expected. The economic situation in Palestine has made it
difficult for families to survive off a one-person paycheck. Therefore, women are now expected
to enter the workforce to support their families. Women are therefore able to use their economic
contributions to renegotiate the previous restrictions placed upon them by eib ideology. When
women gain economic independence, or even when women contribute economically to the
household, they are able to negotiate the way they are seen by their family and community.
Finally, I found that a lot of eib ideology is changing because of inner-community efforts. Older
women, within both the middle and older groups I talked to, expressed how many women in their
generations were forced to marry young and they did not want the same fate for their own
daughters. Although they are aware that they are defying traditional shame ideologies and they
realize there will be repercussions from their community, they believe in the end it is important
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that their daughters are more self-sufficient than they were. Through my conversation with
Zahwa, I showed how women are now banning together to create community support systems
among themselves. They now have the ability to freely discuss eib ideologies in their personal
lives and compare how it also affects the women in their community. They are also able to create
economic opportunities for themselves, even if they do not have a formal education, by utilizing
the skills they already possess. This in the end empowers them more and gives them the ability to
become more self-sufficient.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Throughout this thesis, I examined the ways which shame/eib ideologies impact Palestinian
women’s lives. I first analyzed how Palestinian women in Ramallah defined eib and how it is
enforced in their lives. Through conversations with women, I was able to determine that eib is
anything that goes against social norms and traditions. As well, many women expressed that eib
for them is anything that society deems as inappropriate or wrong. This definition connects back
to my first main thesis question of “what Palestinian women in Ramallah think about shame.”
Every woman indicated that they thought of shame as a phenomenon that has a lot of
repercussions for women in Palestinian society. They believe that eib only affects women in their
society. From the vignette I shared in Chapter 2, it was apparent that men in Palestinian society
were also aware and agree that eib ideology primarily impacts the lives of women. Through this I
was able to determine that eib is a deeply gendered phenomenon. Not only does eib help to
reinforce gendered ideology in Palestine, it is also responsible in many respects for creating the
very ideology it upholds.
The manifestation if eib ideology in women’s everyday lives was another main question
which I addressed with this research. Women expressed that eib pervaded their lives both
consciously and unconsciously. Through their explanations I was able to determine that eib is a
form of habitus in the lives of Palestinian women. It is so deeply entrenched in their daily
functioning, that it difficult to pinpoint every arena of life which it impacts. With this thesis, I
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attempted to shed light on just a few of the broader areas affected by this ideology. Enforcement
of eib ideology is one question which is vital to understanding how eib ideology can take place
and persist. With topics such as shame, previous research was quick to explain it by blaming its
existence on male coercion. However, my collaborators made it extensively clear that male
influence is not the reason they follow eib ideology, nor is it the means in which it is enforced.
Women expressed that enforcement of eib ideology was perpetuated mostly by women
themselves. Not only do women self-monitor their own thoughts and behaviors, but other women
in their lives, particularly their mothers, are responsible for teaching and reinforcing eib ideology
in the young women in their lives. It is important to note that shame occurs not just for things
that have happened, but for things that have not happened or were never really ever going to
happen in the first place. Therefore, self-monitoring is used as a tool to prevent shaming for
potential actions.
I explored the significance of space in the third chapter of this thesis because it is an
important component of how shame manifests in the daily lives of Palestinian women. Space, in
the context of eib ideology, is an essential tool that is used to enforce and negotiate where
women can and cannot occupy. Eib ideology, in the case of space, is essential to the formation of
public and domestic space. Domestic spaces in Palestinian society have been, and still are,
reserved exclusively as women’s spaces, whereas public spaces are exclusively male. I found
that with the progression of time, the negotiation of space has begun to transform along with
other aspects of eib ideology. Before, public spaces were seen as inappropriate and it was
shameful for women to enter those spaces. However, the newfound need for women to enter the
formal economy has shifted the spaces that are deemed acceptable for women to occupy. Eib
ideology is a tool which inscribes meaning into space, more specifically the built environment, in
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Palestinian society. A place takes on the collective thought of a group of people, meaning that an
ideological thought that occurs within the group therefore reflects itself on the space they
occupy. Along with the physical built environment, women’s bodies are also seen as spaces upon
which eib ideology can be ascribed. Women’s movement in space, and as I explained,
subsequently as space, is directed by the concept of eib. As I previously stated, eib creates and
negotiates which space is deemed acceptable and how that space can be interpreted and used.
Finally, I examined how and why shame ideologies have shifted across generations of
Palestinian women. This question gets at the theoretical grounding of this thesis. Past research
regarding shame in the Middle East never fully acknowledged the ways which shame shifts
through time, or that it shifts at all. By ignoring this reality, researchers have ignored the lived
experiences of Arab women of all ages and reinforced, whether intentionally or not, the idea that
Arab society is stagnant. I found that the changes that have occurred in the way eib ideology is
viewed and practice by Palestinian women is integral to the understanding of Palestinian society
today. Not only has eib shifted with different generations of women, within a single woman’s
life, the meaning and reality of shame ideology in her life will change drastically as she ages. Eib
presents itself in very different ways for a woman depending on her age. Within the final chapter
of this thesis, I examined five arenas (globalization, technology, economy, education, and innercommunity change) which have contributed to the shifting of eib ideology from generation to
generation. Through my conversations with women, I found that these were key spheres which
were continually brought up as most impacted by the changes to eib ideology.
I found that it was important to examine shame ideologies in the framework of
generational changes because it allowed for a more thorough understanding of the composition
of gendered realities in Palestine. As I stated above, globalization was a consistent theme that
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came up in conversation throughout my fieldwork. Although globalization is often perceived as
an exchange of ideas from the West to eager recipients in the East, many of the women I talked
to discusses the ease in which the Arab world can exchange ideas with one another. Eib ideology
exists within other Arab countries as well, but with the newfound ease of exchange with other
Arab countries, Palestinians are now incorporating other ways of thinking about eib into their
own practice of shame. This means that certain traditional Palestinian customs that were closely
related to eib ideology have been transformed or viewed through a new lens. One of the main
modes which new ideas are able to reach the people in Palestine is technology. As I showed,
technology has allowed for Palestinians to interact with people both inside Palestine and outside
of the country. Technology has also created new spaces which shame ideology can be
perpetuated or where it can be circumvented. The next arena which shame ideology has
drastically shifted is the education of women in Palestine. As opposed to in the past where it was
considered eib for a girl to attend school, young girls and women are now expected to attend
school. Now, a woman receiving an education is seen as a vital part of her development both
because she is more equipped to enter the formal workforce and she becomes a more desirable
marriage partner. Changing eib ideology surrounding schooling for girls has shifted the
barometer for what a well-rounded respectable woman is considered in Palestinian society. The
shifting of educational expectations for women has also impacted (and has been impacted) by the
economic reality in Palestine. Due to the limited economic opportunities, women are being
called upon to help contribute to their family’s bills. This new ability for women to enter the
workforce without the restrictions that older generations were subjected to has allowed for a shift
in the way in which Palestinians think about shame and women’s work.
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Finally, I found that many components of eib ideology is changing because of innercommunity efforts. Older generations of Palestinian women have begun to take stock of their
own lives and realized that they did not want their daughters to live the same lives they did.
Therefore, they are pushing for their daughters to explore more options, such as receiving an
education, so that they can be more self-sufficient than they were. Through my conversation with
Zahwa, I showed how women are now banning together to create community support systems
among themselves where they can now freely discuss eib ideologies in their personal lives and
listen to other women’s experiences with it. They are also able to create economic opportunities
for themselves, even those who do not have a formal education, by utilizing the skills they
already possess. This in the end empowers them more and gives them the ability to become more
self-sufficient.
However, I want to take this opportunity to explore a case that shows how the
transformation of eib ideology does not always benefit women in a positive way. After I left my
fieldwork in Palestine to return to the United States at the beginning of August 2019, something
happened that garnered a robust response from not only Palestinians, but people around the Arab
world. Israa Ghrayeb was a 21-year-old Palestinian woman from Beit Sahour, a part of
Bethlehem, who was killed by her brothers and father in what is labeled as an “honor killing.”
Upon initial reports of the killing, it was said that the day before Israa was with her fiancé and a
female cousin at a café, while there she and her fiancé took a picture together, which she then
posted on the internet. Many news outlets reported that this was the reason she was killed,
because of this picture. They stated that her brothers and father believed the picture was
shameful, so they therefore tried to kill her at home, which did not work at first, and followed her
to the hospital where they beat her to death. However, something they didn’t realize was that a
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member of the hospital staff was in the hallway recording the killing. In the recording, although I
could not bring myself to listen to it, you can hear Israa being killed in a horrific manner. This
caused a mass wave of protests throughout Palestine as the news of Israa’s death traveled around
the Arab world.
When I heard about Israa’s death, I was deeply disturbed and became engrossed in the
details of her case. As I read more and more about what happened, I felt that there was
something missing in the reports and the details of the case began to not make sense to me. To
start, it made no sense that she would be killed for taking a picture with her fiancé, especially
since she has a cousin present at the time. From what women told me during my fieldwork, it is
not in violation of shame ideologies for a woman to be pictured or go to a café with a man she is
engaged to. As well, in this situation Israa did everything right. She had a female cousin with her
so she was not alone with him and she was engaged to her fiancé through the approval of both of
their families. So, for the media to deem it an “honor killing” because of a picture made no sense
to me. Then I read something that unintentionally exposed the reasoning behind Israa’s killing.
Apparently, a few hours before the killing took place, another female cousin of Israa went to
Israa’s brothers and father and essentially taunted them. She accused them of not having control
over Israa and allowing her to do whatever she wanted because Israa was the primary
breadwinner in the family. Israa’s father and brothers did not have jobs due to the economic
crisis in Palestine, but Israa did. So therefore, she helped her family financially and according to
the shifts in eib ideology, this is seen as a mark of a respectable woman. However, I believe the
cousins taunting struck a nerve within the men because she was essentially exposing them for not
fulfilling one of their three only duties as Arab men, which are to get married, have children, and
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provide economically. They then killed Israa not because of any impropriety on her end, but
because of their own masculine insecurities.
So, even when a woman is following eib ideology and is being a respectable member of
their community, the threat men feel to women becoming more involved in previously
sanctioned “male-only” spheres has created a tumultuous environment for women to navigate.
With the changes in eib ideology for Palestinian women, comes another obstacle in the form of
threatened Arab masculinity. I think it is dangerous for both scholars and the media to push the
idea of killings such as Israa’s be labeled as “honor killings” because it puts the blame solely on
the female victim. As shown through Israa’s case, women can do everything right, follow shame
ideologies perfectly and be a respectable member of their community, and still get killed or hurt
because men feel that women have become a threat to their standing as men. This killing was not
an “honor killing” because nothing shameful took place. This killing and, many more like it
throughout Palestine, are products of misogynistic framework that pervades the construction of
Palestinian masculinity. These killings are not “honor killings,” but more appropriately, they are
examples of the countless, nameless, faceless victims of femicide that permeates the Arab world.
I believe future work on eib ideology is essential to the continual understanding of
Palestinian women’s gendered realities. With future research I would like to take the opportunity
to go to the villages many of the women I talked to came from and explore how the women still
living in those villages view eib ideology. It is important to understand the nuanced ways which
shame shifts because not all women experience it in the same ways. I think a topic that should be
address along with this one is the formation and understanding of Palestinian masculinity. As I
laid out with this thesis, eib ideology is essentially a guidebook for women on how to live a
respectable life. However, the formation of masculinity for Palestinian men does not operate
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within these same parameters. If Israa’s case taught me, and hopefully other scholars anything,
its that there needs to be more of a concerted effort to understand Arab men’s lives through a
lens of gendered critique because when this is not done, instances such as Israa’s killing are
analyzed solely through the lens of female improprieties as opposed to threatened masculinity.
I would like to end this thesis on a more positive note. Palestinian women of all ages wish
to live respectable lives. Women’s ability to now receive an education and enter the economic
sphere has shifted the expectations women have for their lives and the lives of the women who
they love. Palestinian women of all ages live their lives to the fullest of their ability. They have
dreams, ambitions, family and friends whom they love, hobbies, work. Although this topic does
touch upon the darker parts of their lives, it is important to note that Palestinian women
experience joy just like anyone else. The existence of eib in their life does not limit their
happiness. As Muna puts it:
I am proud for being a Palestinian woman because I can see that being a woman is a point
of strength and the fact that people might think that if you’re a man you have better
opportunities, I would say it’s not true. It’s not being seen and people realize women are
more dedicated, more hardworking. If we believe in something, we really carry it out.
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Table 1

Interview Questions

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
11a.
11b.
11c.
12

Interview Questions
How would you define and describe shame (eib)?
What do you think about shame (eib)?
What do people in your life typically feel shamed by?
Do you agree that these things are shameful?
Have there been any events or moments that have cause you to feel
shame recently? What are they and how did you respond?
How does shame (eib) impact your life?
How was shame (eib) talked about while you were growing up?
Was it openly discussed? If yes, explain in what ways. If no, why do
you think it wasn't talked about?
Was it talked about in a positive or negative way?
Who were the people who would discuss shame (eib)?
How does your idea of shame differ from your mother or grandmother?

What do you think about shame as a daughter?
What do you think about shame as a mother?
What do you think about shame as a grandmother?
How has your understanding/thoughts of shame changed over time?
Who can you use "eib" toward? In what situations? Tell me one or two
13 situations where you can use "eib" towards another person.
Who can use "eib" to you? How do you respond to their use of the
13a. word?
Who taught you what shame is? Is this person close to you? Explain
14 why they are important?
15 In what ways do you experience shame in your everyday life?
16 How is shame a part of your daily life?
How does the way you, as a woman, think about shame differ from the
17 men in your life? Can you give me some examples?
Do you think you have different expectations than the men in your
18 life? What are your expectations?
19 Why do you think the expectations are different for women and men?
20 What does it mean to you to be a woman in Palestinian society?
21 How are you expected to act as a Palestinian woman?
Why do you think the way you/the women in your community
22 experience and think about shame has changed over time?
What are some specific elements of shame that have changed for you
and your community? What do you think the cause of this shift has
23 been?
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